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All statistical data published in  this Report are  provisional for 197  4 and often for 
1973 as  well.  Throughout this  Report data for the Community as  a whole refer 
to the  present  nine  member  countries;  statistics  for  years  prior  to  1973 have 
been  adjusted to add  data for the three  new member countries to those of the 
original  "Six". 
The  equivalent  in  units  of account  of amounts  in  national  currencies  has  been 
calculated at exchange parities or central exchange rates as  appropriate. For cur-
rencies  which began  floating  in  1972 exchange  parities declared to the  Interna-
tional  Monetary  Fund  were  replaced  as  from  mid-1972, initially  by  the  middle 
closing  rate  on  29th December  1972.  For  the  currencies  which  began  floating 
in  early  1973, exchange parities were replaced, initially by the middle closing rate 
on  the  19th or 20th of March,  as  appropriate.  The  conversion  rates  for curren-
cies  with  floating  exchange  rates  were  subsequently  altered  whenever  the 
monthly average  of market rates  varied  by more than  5 %  from the conversion 
rate  in  use.  These  conversion  rates  were applied  to the available  statistical  ma-
terial  in  the  following  manner: 
- for individual  operations and  for amounts outstanding at any  particular time, 
the  conversion  rate  appropriate  to the  period  was  used 
- for annual  totals (such  as  for Gross  National  Product or Gross  Fixed  Invest-
ment),  a weighted average  of conversion  rates  in  force during  the year  was 
used. 
The conversion  rate for the EURCO  which consists of the sum of fixed amounts 
of the currencies  of all  the  member countries of the  European  Community was 
taken  to be  that in  force  when  the first EURCO  issue  was made  in  September 
1973. 
For statistics relating  to  19  7  4  expressed  in  national currencies,  conversion  rates 
as  at 30 December  1974 of a newly defined  unit of account based  on  a "bas-
ket''  of  Member  States'  currencies  have  been  applied.  The  composition  of this 
basket is  such that as of 28th June  1974 the sum  of the component currencies 
would  have  been  equal  in  value  to  the  International  Monetary  Fund's  Special 
Drawing  Right  when  calculated  on  the  same  basis  as  the  latter,  and  hence  the 
same  as  the  Bank's  statutory  unit  of account. INTRODUCTION 
The  year  197  4  was one  of transition  for the  European  Community as  a whole 
from  boom  conditions  at  its  beginning  to the  onset  of recession  at  its  end.  In 
the  process economic activity and  capital  markets were subjected  to exception-
ally strong and  varied  influences which had  a marked impact on  investment and 
its  financing. 
The momentum of the expansion of activity in  1973 continued in  most countries 
into  19  7  4, bringing in  its train high and  rising rates of inflation to which was ad-
ded  the effect of a five-fold  increase  in  the  price  of petroleum  imposed  by the 
oil-exporting countries.  In  order to counter these threats to the financial  stability 
and  balances  of payments of Member Countries,  there  was a  general  move by 
national  authorities  to  reinforce  policies  for  the  containment  of  inflation  and, 
where  necessary,  to strengthen  their  international  reserve  positions  by external 
borrowing. 
Essential  as  it was to tackle these  serious  problems without delay,  it is  possible 
that  the  measures  adopted  in  the  first  half  of  197  4  accentuated  the  cyclical 
downturn in  economic activity which  began  during the summer months.  It is  at 
least  clear  that the  measures  led  to a sharp  and  widespread  increase  in  short-
term interest rates which drained funds from long-term capital markets at a time 
when  the confidence  of investors  who normally  purchased  long-term securities 
was already shaken  by exceptionally high rates of inflation. Another feature oper-
ating  in  the same direction was the preference shown by oil  exporting countries 
for placing  their  surplus  revenue  in  short-term  markets. 
Long-term  capital  markets  accordingly  suffered  serious  difficulties  around  the 
middle of the year;  yields rose  sharply and  the terms to maturity of new issues, 
where these were still feasible,  had to be  drastically curtailed.  Undoubtedly these 
difficulties and the high cost of finance were discouraging to prospective borrow-
ers,  but they  seem  not in  themselves  to have  been  mainly  responsible  for the 
falling  away of fixed  investment  activity. 
The  reduction in  fixed capital formation which occurred  in  many Member coun-
tries during  1974 seems,  on  the other hand, to have been  mainly attributable to 
waning  confidence  on  the  part  of enterprises  which  were  able  to foresee  the 
development of a recession.  Consequently fixed  investment remained  depressed 
in  the last quarter of 1974 even  after the direction of policy had  been  changed 2 
from  restraint  to ease  and  investors  had  begun  to return  to long-term  capital 
markets. 
It is  worth noting that while the  profit margins of enterprises  suffered  in  many 
instances from official restraints on  prices  as  well  as  from the rising  cost of in-
puts,  thus reducing  the amount of finance  available  from  internal  resources  for 
new investment, the reduction in the volume of fixed capital formation which oc-
curred  in  several  countries  nevertheless  helped  to preserve  self-financing  ratios. 
Another apparently  paradoxical  development  in  the  difficult financial  climate  of 
197  4 was the maintenance of a high volume of personal saving, even  at negative 
real  rates of interest, which was probably influenced from mid-year onwards by 
perspectives  of rising  unemployment. 
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CHAPTER  1 
INVESTMENT 
1.1.  INVESTMENT AND  THE  ECONOMIC  SETTING 
After the  boom  in  1973 and  the  shock  of a 
five-fold  increase  in  petroleum  prices  towards 
the  end  of  that  year,  industrialised  countries 
experienced  a  slowing  of  economic  growth 
which from mid-197  4 onwards developed into 
a slide  into recession.  The  persistence  of high 
and  rising  rates of inflation during  197  4 which 
had  been  generated  during  the  preceding 
boom  had  adverse  repercussions  on  capital 
markets  and  hence  on  prospects  for  raising 
long-term finance.  In  consequence, the outlook 
for fixed  investment activity was generally  un-
favourable.  Total  investment  expenditures  in 
the European  Community declined last year  by 
2.2  per  cent  in  volume terms.  As can  be  seen 
from  Table 1 the value  of Gross  Fixed  Invest-
ment Formation rose by  13. 1 per cent in  19  7  4 
which  was  a slightly  lower figure  than  in  the 
previous  year. 
There  was  nevertheless  a  marked  disparity  in 
the  investment  performance  ot'  Member  Sta-
tes.  In  thr~e  countries,  France,  Belgium  and 
Italy,  the  volume  of  fix~d  investment  in  fact 
increased.  This  reflected  the  prolongation  of 
the  strong  expansion  of activity  in  1973 into 
1974 and  resulted  in  an  impressive  out-turn 
for  the  year  as  a whole,  even  though  by the 
last quarter conditions were deteriorating, par·-
ticularly  in  Italy.  In  three  countries,  Germany, 
Luxembourg  ~nd the  Netherlands,  investment 
volu!lle fell in  197  4 largely because of the ear-
lier  onset  of  business  stagnation.  In  the  last 
group  of  countries,  comprising  the  United 
Kingdom,  Ireland  and  Denmark,  where  the 
volume  of· fixed  investment also  fell  last  year, 
business  confidence  was  affected  by  a  wider 
range  of factors including  higher than  average 
rates  of  inflation  and  serious  current  account 
deficits in  their balances of external  payments. 
In  France,  among  the first  group of countries, 
the  prolongation  into  1974 of the  economic 
growth  which  was  re-stimulated  in  1973 ex-
tended  into the holiday period  in  August.  Sub-
sequently,  there  was  a clear  change  of direc-
tion  as  recessionary  tendencies,  accentuated 
by official anti-inflationary policies, became ap-
parent  and  led  to  an  increase  in  unemploy-
ment. 
The  change  from  growth to decline  in  the  in-
dex  of industrial  output illustrates  this  change 
of direction  during  1974.  In  the eight  months 
to August, output (including  building) averaged 
4. 1 per  cent  more  than  a year  earlier,  but  in 
the last four months it was  1. 7 per cent lower. 
This slackening  in  the economy had  an  impact 
on  employment  and  the  numbers  of  unem-
ployed  increased  by  42  per  cent  (seasonally 
adjusted)  between  the  end  of August  and  the 
end  of December.  It  also  affected  Gross ·Na-
tional  Product  calculated  at  constant  prices 
which rose  less  in  197  4,  by 3.8 per cent,  than 
previously  expected.  These  developments 
were,  however,  masked  in  a  15.6  per  cent 
increase  in  the :value  of G.N.P.  because  of an 
average  rise  of about  11.5  per· cent  in  prices. 
The  restrictive  stance  of  monetary  policy 
which was adopted in  December  1972 contin-
ued  throughout  1973  and  1974.  This  policy 
succeeded  in  reducing  liquidity and  in  causing 
enterprises to re-examine their investment pro-
grammes,  but developments in  the  earlier  part 
of  1974 seemed  to  require  further  measures. 
The  precautionary  consumer  buying  surge  in 
the first quarter of the year  which  had  caused 
temporary  shortages  of  supplies  seemed  to 
make it essential  to reverse  inflationary expec-
tations.  At the  same  time a rise  in  imports of 
capital  equipment to meet the still  appreciable 
requirements  of enterprises  added  to France's 
deficit  on  current  account  in  the  balance  of 
payments.  Monetary  policy  was  accordingly 
tightened  in  January  and,  as  part  of a  wider 
range of measures to cool  the economy, again 4 
Table  1 - Gross fixed investment in the Community (1)(2) 
Percentage change from previous year 
In Value  In Volume 
1969  1970  1971  1972  1973 1974  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974 
Germany  17.2  23.9  12.2  7.0  5.1  -2.1  11.3  11.0  4.5  3.0  0.5  -8.1 
France  16.3  13.1  11.6  12.4  13.3  18.8  9.4  5.8  6.6  7.4  5.9  2.9 
United Kingdom  4.7  9.6  10.9  11.4  19.5  '17.1  0.2  2.1  2.0  2.5  2.6  -2.8 
Italy  14.1  14.2  3.7  5.8  25.3  34.1  7.4  2.7  -3.1  0.4  8.2  4.2 
Netherlands  3.6  18.3  13.4  4.0  11.5  6.8  -2.1  10.1  3.3  -3.5  5.6  -4.2 
Belgium  9.8  18.6  6.4  8.9  14.6  22.3  5.3  8.4  -1.7  4.4  7.8  5.6 
Denmark  18.9  10.3  9.3  15.2  19.4  6.5  13.2  3.0  4.4  7.9  6.1  -10.4 
Ireland  28.4  9.2  18.0  15.0  24.3  14.0  20.4  -0.9  7.2  3.7  12.8  -8.3 
Luxembourg  16.7  21.2  23.4  7.9  18.7  5.4  7.8  10.7  12.9  3.2  11.3  -7.3 
Total Community  13.3  16.6  10.5  9.0  13.2  13.1  7.4  6.7  3.3  3.5  3.9  -2.2 
( 1)  The percentages for 197  4 are approximations based on orders of magnitude. 
(2)  For individual countries, percentages are based on amounts in national currencies. For the Community total, 
currencies are converted into units of account at  1970 rates. 
in  June,  by  increases  in  reserve  requirements 
and  reductions  in  credit  ceilings.  The  counter-
part in  fiscal  policy,  announced  at  the  start of 
tt:le new Presidency, included increases in  taxes 
on  income, a reduction in  the rate of deprecia-
tion  allowances,  the freezing  of profits result-
ing from inflation, and a cut in  government ex-
penditure in  197  4.  It should be  added,  howev-
er,  that  because  of the  deterioration  in  econ-
omic conditions towards the end  of 1974, the 
orientation  of monetary and  fiscal  policy  was 
changed  in  early  1975. 
The  response of gross fixed  investment to the 
introduction  or  reinforcement  of  restrictive 
measures normally tends to be delayed and  its 
performance in  1974 proved to be  no  excep-
tion  in  that  it  continued  to  grow  (2.9 %)  in 
volume, if at a slower rate than in  recent years. 
Owing to a much higher degree  Qf  price  infla-
tion,  however,  the  increase  in  the  value  of 
capital  investment  of  18.8  per  cent  in  197  4 
was greater than the 13.3 per cent recorded in 
1973. 
France  was not alone  in  experiencing  a carry-
over  of  the  momentum  of  expansion  into 
1974 as the Belgian economy continued in  the 
first half of that year to be  strongly influenced 
by the expansionary forces evident  in  the  pre-
vious  two  years.  Many  of  the  indicators  of 
economic activity showed a more pronounced 
upward  movement  for  the  year  as  a  whole 
than  in  most other countries of the Commun-
ity.  The  volume of Gross  National  Product  in-
creased  by  4.3  per  cent,  one  of  the  highest 
rates of growth in  the EEC  last year.  Industrial 
output by the third  quarter was about six  per 
cent above a year earlier,  while unemployment 
was only slightly higher than in  1973. In  short, 
the  downturn of the  economic cycle  was  de-
layed  in  Belgium  until  the late  summer which 
happened to coincide with a marked stiffening 
in  official  policies,  and  particularly in  the mon-
etary  sphere.  This  policy  reinforcement  was 
prompted  by  an  acceleration  in  the  rate  of 
price inflation. The retail  price index which had 
risen  7.3 per cent in  the  12 months to Decem-
ber  1973, rose  more rapidly  during  1974 and 
in  December was  15.7  per cent above a year 
earlier.  The  potential  loss  of  competitiveness 
vis-a-vis Belgium's trading partners, particularly 
in  the  Community,  caused  concern. 
Capital  invest~ent expenditures  increased  ra-
pidly  in  1974 as  a  result  of the expansionary 
climate  in  the  first  half  of  the  year.  Both 
domestic and  external  demand were such  that 
a  number  of  Belgian  industries  reached  peak 
capacity  utilisation  and  investment in  new ca-
pacity became  necessary.  As  in  other sectors, however, the peak growth in  investment activ-
ity took place  before  August.  In  that month a 
number  of measures  were  introduced  by  the 
public  authorities,  including  a  halt  to  permits 
on  very  large  buildings  and  restrictions  on 
mortgage credit,  designed  to restrain  inflation-
ary  demand  pressures,  and  these  began  to 
make  themselves  felt  before  the  end  of  the 
year.  Total  capital expenditures rose  in  volume 
by about 6 per cent in  197  4,  and  by about 22 
per  cent  in  value  terms.  Belgium  was  one  of 
the  relatively few countries of the  Community 
in  which  real  investment growth last  year  ex-
ceeded  that of the  economy  as  a  whole. 
This was not the case  in  Luxembourg although 
the  overall  economy experienced  a very satis-
factory expansion in  197  4 despite some weak-
ening  towards the end  of the year.  Gross  Na-
tional  Product at current prices was estimated 
to  have  increased  by  about  16  per  cent  last 
year,  of which  real  growth formed  about  4.5 
per  cent.  The  basis  for  this  relatively  strong 
performance, as  in  1973, was the continuation 
of  good  markets  for  crude  steel  (steel  being 
Luxembourg's  main  industry)  stimulating  an 
8.8 per cent rise  in  output to which was added 
a 26 per cent increase  in  prices.  As a result of 
higher  volume  and  prices  for  steel,  total  ex-
ports of goods and  services  rose  by some  28 
per cent in  value last year-not far short of the 
31  per  cent  increase  in  1973. The  agricultural 
sector  registered  a  modest  3.3  per  cent  in-
crease  in  the value of output, as  lower produce 
prices  tended  to offset a rise  in  production.  In 
October,  however,  there  was  a sharp  deterio-
ration  in  the  markets  for  steel  products,  ad-
versely affected  by stagnation  in  the econom-
ies  of other Community countries and  by par-
ticular  problems  in  certain  industries  such  as 
automobiles. 
Investment activity in  housing and  on  the  part 
of public  authorities  was  quite substantial  but 
that of businesses was markedly weak.  In  total 
the value of fixed investment in  Luxembourg is 
estimated  to  have  risen  by  5.4  per  cent  last 
year, but of this amount about 11  per cent was 
attributable to higher prices, volume having de-
clined  by  around  7  per  cent. 
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To some extent the experience of Italy in  1974 
resembled that of the three Member Countries 
examined  above  in  detail  in  that  the  momen-
tum  of the  1973 expansion  carried  over  into 
the following year.  Until June-July there was a 
moderate,  though,  waning  degree  of underly-
ing  strength  in  the  economy  deriving  from  a 
rapid  increase  in  industrial expansion  and  from 
capital  investment expenditures. The downturn 
is  clearly illustrated by the industrial production 
index  which  during  the  second  quarter  of 
1974 averaged  9.6  per  cent  more than  in  the 
comparable  period  of  1973, but which fell  in 
the  fourth  quarter  to  8.2  per  cent  below  its 
level  a year earlier.  Nevertheless,  in  1974 as  a 
whole,  Gross  Domestic  Product  increased  by 
3.4  per  cent  in  volume  terms  while  the  value 
of  GDP  including  an  appreciable  element  of 
price  inflation  rose  by  20.6  per  cent. 
The downturn in  activity in  the second  half of 
the  year  was  brought  about  partly  by official 
action  to  tackle  the  acute  problems  that  ex-
pansion  brought  in  its  train  and  partly  by  a 
general  decline in  confidence.  One  of the more 
serious  problems  was  that  of  price  inflation 
which accelerated from an  annual  rate of 12.5 
per  cent  in  December  1973 to  24.5  per  cent 
a year  later. The  increase  in  price inflation had 
a sharply adverse effect upon the external pay-
ments  deficit  already  suffering  under  the  im-
pact  of the  oil  crisis  and  wide,  if  unjustified, 
concern  was  felt  that  control  over  economic 
forces might slip from the grasp of the national 
authorities. 
Higher  oil  import  costs  taken  in  conjunction 
with  the  increased  flow  of  imports  resulting 
from  the  economic  expansion  of the first  half 
of the year,  resulted  in  a rapid  build-up of the 
deficit on  current account of the Italian balance 
of payments.  In  the  first six  months of  1974 
the  current  account  deficit  was  approaching 
four  times  that  of  the  corresponding  1973 
period and  there was an  abrupt loss of reserve 
assets.  This  situation  impelled  the  public  au-
thorities  to  seek  supplemental  finance  from 
abroad,  and  in  the  first  quarter  of  197  4  a 
1 000  million  S.D.R.  stand-by  credit  was  ar-
ranged  with the  International  Monetary  Fund. 6 
As part of this arrangement, the Italian govern-
ment  agreed  to  pursue  stiffer  monetary  and 
fiscal  policies  than  hitherto.  A  limit  of  Lit. 
22 400  milliard  on  the  overall  expansion  of 
domestic  credit  originating  from  all  sources 
was agreed as  well as a limit on  the size of the 
central  government's financial  deficit.  In  a  se-
parate  move,  the  Italian  authorities  made  the 
ceilings  on  bank  credit,  which  had  been  in 
force  since  mid-1973,  more  effective  from 
end-March  1974 onwards.  Later  in  the  year 
other credit and  swap facilities  were obtained, 
including  a  loan  from  the  Deutsche  Bundes-
bank  and  the  conversion  of short-term  assis-
tance granted by the Community in  1973 into 
a  medium-term  credit. 
As  these  necessary  remedial  measures  were 
taken  in  the  attempt  to  contain  the  external 
deficit and  to bring  inflation under control, the 
second half of the year proved to be one of re-
trenchment.  By  end-year  these  efforts  were 
coming closer to success, and while the non-oil 
external trade balance achieved a surplus in  the 
month of December,  it was not until  the first 
half of 1975 that there was any significant re-
duction  in  the  annual  rate  of price  inflation. 
In the second half of 1973 a resurgence of ca-
pital  investment  went  hand  in  hand  with  the 
strong growth of industrial output at that time. 
This  continued  into the first half of  19  7  4  but 
fixed  investment  suffered  thereafter  from  the 
effect of a decline in  confidence as  a result of 
the loss of equilibrium both domestically and  in 
the  external  payments  position.  Total  capital 
investment rose  by  4.2  per  cent  in  volume  in 
1974 and by about 34 per cent in value terms. 
In  the second group of countries  in  which the 
onset of a recession  depressed  investment ac-
tivity,  Germany experienced  its  lowest rate  of 
growth  since  1967.  The  implementation  of 
policies designed to curb inflation and to meet 
the challenge presented by the greatly increas-
ed  cost of oil imports coincided with a cyclical 
slowing  of the  economy.  Although  the  worst 
of the current recession  was yet to come,  the 
German  economy was in  a  better position  by 
end-197  4  than  some other member countries 
of the Community. The  efforts of the authori-
ties were successful in  that they prevented any 
further rise  in  the rate of inflation, as  measured 
by the cost of living index, and even  conduced 
to a  lower  monthly  rate  of increase  in  prices 
than  in  the previous year.  Meanwhile, a strong 
tendency  towards surplus  in  Germany's exter-
nal  payments  had  shrugged  off  the  negative 
impact of higher  oil  prices. 
However, success in  overcoming the economic 
problems  prevalent  in  197  4  was  only  made 
possible  at  the  cost  of higher  unemployment 
and  a reduction in  capacity utilisation. The vol-
ume  of  Gross  National  Product  increased  by 
only  0.4 per  cent  last  year,  compared  with  a 
gain of 5.1  per cent in  1973. At current prices, 
GNP  increased  by 7.0 per  cent last year  with 
the  major  impetus being  provided  by  govern-
ment expenditures. 
It  was  against  this  background  of  weak 
domestic  demand,  a  diminution  in  confidence 
as  to future business  prospects and  a squeeze 
on  profit margins,  that  capital  investment  ex-
penditures tended to be reduced in  1974, both 
in  volume and value terms. The volume of ca-
pital  investment  in  Germany  declined  by  8. 1 
per cent  last year and  this decline was shared 
almost equally by the  new construction sector 
and  the  machinery  and  equipment  sector.  In 
value terms the decline was not so  severe and 
total capital  investment was only 2. 1 per  cent 
lower than  in  the  previous  year. 
The  downturn  in  capital  expenditures  may 
have  been  moderated  by  the  attempt of  the 
German authorities, who were particularly con-
cerned  over  the  serious  effects  being  felt  by 
the construction and  equipment manufacturing 
industries,  to boost fixed  investment  by  fiscal 
measures,  including  repeal  of  the  investment 
tax  in  December  1973. 
Somewhat similar trends  prevailed  in  the  Ne-
therlands and the development of the economy 
in  1974, apart  from  the temporary uncertain-
ties  caused  by  the  oil  crisis,  was  basically  a 
reaction  to  an  over-rapid  expansion  in  1972 
and  1973.  Thus  the  slowing  of growth  was 
mainly  the result  of internal  factors such  as  a decline  in  the  volume  of private  consumption 
and  a  reduction  of  investment  activity.  To  a 
minor extent the slackening of economic activ-
ity  in  neighbouring  countries  also  exercised  a 
slowing influence on  the growth of the Nether-
lands'  economy.  It  was  not  in  fact  until  the 
fourth  quarter  that  industrial  production,  in-
cluding  the  output  of  mining  and  public  utili-
ties,  fell  below the level  reached  a year  earlier. 
Gross  National  Product  in  volume  terms  rose 
by  3.3  per  cent  in  1974 which  represented  a 
slowing  in  the  growth  rate  from  the  4. 7  per 
cent  achieved  in  the  previous  year.  At current 
prices  GNP  increased  by  12.3 per  cent as  the 
value  of  government  and  consumer  expendi-
tures  increased  sharply  under  the influence  of 
rising  prices. 
Some  encouragement  for  investment  in  the 
important  sector  of  industries  producing  for 
external  markets may have  been  derived  from 
an  increase in  the value of exports of the order 
of  36  per  cent  in  1974, with a  large  part  of 
this  being  attributable  to  price  inflation.  But 
generally,  in  an. era  when  price  inflation  over-
shadowed  economic growth and  the  recuper-
ation  of increased  costs  proved  both  difficult 
and  slow,  the  private  sector  was  reluctant  to 
expand  capital  investment.  Public  sector  in-
vestment  had  been  declining  for  some  years 
because requirements had  already been  met in 
many  important  aspects.  Last  year,  the  value 
of  total  capital  investment  rose  by  6.8  per 
cent,  but in  volume terms declined  by  4.2  per 
cent.  This  weakness of capital  expenditures  in 
197  4  was  shared  by  the  public  and  private 
sectors  alike. 
Among the countries experiencing the complex 
problems of low growth, high rates of inflation, 
rising  unemployment, and  serious external  de-
ficits, the United Kingdom was again in  difficulty 
last  year.  Not only  were  its  problems  among 
the worst in  the Community countries, but ev-
ents were proving stronger, by the end  of last 
year and in  early  1975, than the countervailing 
government  policies  to  stem  these  adverse 
trends. The pattern of industrial activity for the 
year  was  shaped  at  the  outset  by  the  three 
day  working  week  in  January  and  February, 
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declared  as  a  result  of  the  miners'  industrial 
dispute  and  the  consequent  energy  shortage. 
This  event  curtailed  industrial  production  by 
5.5  per cent compared with output in  the pre:: 
vious  quarter (seasonally  adjusted).  Thereafter, 
in  succeeding  quarters,  industrial  output  and 
the  economy  as  a  whole  worked  towards 
making  up  the  ground  lost.  By  the  fourth 
quarter,  however,  increasing  slackness  in  de-
mand was becoming evident both domestically 
and  externally.  For the year as  a whole,  indus-
trial  production  fell  by  3.4  per  cent.  Gross 
Domestic Product was a little less affected and 
increased  in  volume by 0.6 per  cent  in  1974, 
but was nevertheless one of the lowest growth 
rates  in  the  Community. 
The  deterioration  in  the  visible  trade  deficit 
from  £ 2.3  milliard  in  1973 to  £ 5.3  milliard 
last  year  was  mostly  attributable  to  the  in-
creased  deficit  on  oil  transactions  and  only 
partly to the weakening of export performance. 
The  U.K.  authorities accordingly took the view 
that these  oil-inspired  trade  deficits should  be 
financed  by  capital  inflows  and  a  large-scale 
programme  of  public  sector  borrowing  was 
embarked upon. The floating exchange rate for 
the  pound  hence  scarcely  deteriorated  though 
the  build-up of inflationary pressures  suggest-
ed  that there  would probably  be  trouble  later 
from  the  fact  that earnings  were  rising  faster 
than  prices.  The  Government  wage  policy, 
founded  on  voluntary  restraint,  met with  little 
response  in  that  average  earnings  throughout 
industry had  increased by 25.4 per cent in  the 
year  to the fourth quarter of  1974 compared 
with an  annual growth of 12.7 per cent a year 
earlier.  Over the span  of twelve months to De-
cember  1974 the retail  price index which rose 
by  19.1  per  cent  was signficantly accelerating 
in  contrast  to  most  uther  countries  of  the 
Community. 
In  view of the difficulties experienced last year 
it  was  hardly  surprising  that  total  capital  in-
vestment declined  in  volume terms by 2.8  per 
cent.  At current  prices  gross fixed  investment 
rose  by  1  7. 1  per  cent.  Despite  the  financial 
pressures  resulting  from  the  three-day  week, 
price  control  and  the  surge  of input prices  of 
materials and labour, capital  investment in  cer-8 
tain sectors, particularly manufacturing, contin-
ued  to expand  even  in  volume  terms.  Invest-
ment  projects,  being  of  a  long-term  nature, 
cannot  always  be  immediately  adapted  to 
changed  economic  circumstances  and  the  ca-
pital expenditure cycle tends to lag  behind that 
of the economy as  a whole.  Moreover, the ex-
istence  of  potential  capacity  shortages  in  the 
United Kingdom has long been  recognised with 
the result that work on  long-term projects con-
tinues  despite  shorter-term  difficulties. 
In Ireland there was also a marked slackening in 
the  growth of economic activity last  year  fol-
lowing the  rapid  expansion  of  1973. The  vol-
ume of Gross  National Product rose  only mar-
ginally,  by  0.2  per  cent  in  197  4,  compared 
with an  increase of over 5 per cent in  the pre-
vious year.  However,  these  bald  figures,  while 
indicating the difficulties faced  last year,  hide a 
number  of  disparate  trends.  The  upsurge  of 
import  prices  led  to  a  sharp  ..  increase  in  the 
current account deficit of the  balance  of pay-
ments  to  almost  four  times  that  of  the  pre-
vious  year,  or the  equivalent of more than  1  0 
per cent of GNP.  However, this potential drain 
on  the  external  reserves  was  offset  by  the 
sharply  increased  capital  inflows,  not  only 
through  government  borrowing  abroad  but 
also  by  inflows  to  the  private  sector  which 
made  a  valuable  contribution  to  financing  in-
vestment  in  197  4. 
Problems  were  encountered  last  year  by  the 
farming  community  as  lower  prices  for  cattle 
and higher feed costs resulted in  a reduction of 
farm incomes of about  12 per cent in  terms of 
current  prices  in  197  4.  Since  agriculture  con-
tributed almost 20 per cent of national income 
in  Ireland  in  1973 (by  far  the  highest  propor-
tion  in  the  Community)  the  set-back  of  this 
sector had  a serious effect on  the economy as 
a  whole.  Manufacturing  output  fared  some-
what  better  in  that  an  increase  01  about  2.5 
per  cent  was  registered  for  197  4,  although 
there was a declining trend in  activity from the 
first  quarter  onwards,  with output in  the  final 
quarters  being  lower  than  in  corresponding 
quarters of the  previous  year. 
Capital  investment  conformed  closely  to  the 
general  pattern  of high  inflation  and  low  real 
growth  that  characterised  the  Irish  economy 
last  year.  Total  capital  expenditures  are  esti-
mated to have risen  about  14 per cent in  value 
terms,  but  because  prices  rose  strongly,  such 
as  the  more  than  25 per  cent  increase  in  the 
capital  goods  sector,  there  was  a  decline  in 
volume  of about  8.3  per  cent. 
The Danish economy entered  197  4  in  a rather 
firmer  state  than  the  United  Kingdom  or  Ire-
land  in  that it was still benefitting from the re-
sidual  of  the  relatively  strong  growth  exper-
ienced  in  the  previous  year.  Thus,  for  part  of 
last  year,  until  early  summer,  a  number  of 
economic  aggregates  reflecting  consumer  de-
mand,  production  and  capital  investment con-
tinued to advance appreciably, despite warning 
signs  that  the  economy  was  not  in  balance. 
Concern over the heavy external payments de-
ficit inherited from the previous year  was rein-
forced  by  the  substantially  higher  cost  of  oil 
imports  during  1974.  In  addition,  wage  and 
price  inflation  were  eroding  the  competitive-
ness  of  Danish  products  in  international  mar-
kets  at  a  time  when  those  markets  were  be-
ginning to experience the onset of a recession-
ary phase.  Faced  with the  threat  of these  ad-
verse factors the authorities felt it necessary to 
introduce  more restrictive  fiscal  policies  in  the 
first  half  of the  year  and  to tighten  even  fur-
ther  the  already  fairly  stringent  monetary pol-
icy.  Over  the  year  as  a  whole  the  volume  of 
Gross  Domestic  Product increased  by only 0.8 
per cent in  197  4,  compared with an  expansion 
of  3.4  per  cent  in  the  previous  year. 
Capital  investment  naturally  tended  to  reflect 
the changing pattern of the economy, although 
with  the  usual  time-lag  associated  with  this 
activity.  Thus  the  first  half  of  19  7  4  saw  the 
momentum  of  total  investment  expenditures 
carry the  1973 expansion  further.  Later in  the 
year,  however, the  worsening economic situa-
tion  began  to  impinge  on  this  performance 
and,  for  197  4  as  a whole,  total capital  expen-
ditures  declined  sharply  in  volume  terms  by 
about  1  0.4  per  cent  compared  with  the  pre-
vious year.  In  value,  including a large price ele-
ment total  capital  expenditures  rose  by about 
6.5  per  cent  in  1974. 1.2.  INVESTMENT IN  THE 
COMMUNITY COUNTRIES  BY  SECTOR: 
BUSINESS  INVESTMENT, 
HOUSING  CONSTRUCTION,  AND  PUBLIC 
AUTHORITIES  INVESTMENT 
The  value  of business investment in  the Com-
munity as  a whole increased  by  12.9 per  cent 
·in  1974  to  134.6  milliard  units  of  account. 
This  figure  represented  59.4  per  cent  of the 
total of Community gross fixed  investment of 
all  kinds,  as  can  be  seen  from  Table 2.  The 
larger increase  in  the value  of business  invest-
ment  last  year  than  in  1973  owes  much  to 
faster  rates  of inflation.  In  volume  terms,  the 
pattern of the year  was one of slower growth 
or decline  of business  investment  in  the  var-
ious  Community  countries  as  anti-inflationary 
policies were reinforced and later as  recession-
ary tendencies took a firmer hold of their econ-
omies. 
In  order to limit the growth of government ex-
penditures  during  an  inflationary  period  there 
·was  often  pressure  to cut back  on  public  au-
thorities'  investment  as  being  one  of the few 
areas  of discretionary  spending.  However,  ac-
celerating  increases  in  prices  tended  to  frus-
trate this aim of policy and  the current cost of 
total  investment  by  public  authorities  in  the 
Community rose by 17.4 per cent to 34.4 mil-
liard  units  of account  last  year. 
Throughout the Community dwelling construc-
tion  came  under  pressure  from  the  aftermath 
of  the  boom  conditions  experienced  in  most 
countries in  the early  1970's. Often there was 
a surplus of unsold  new houses at high  prices 
overhanging  the  market  and  depressing  pros-
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pects for a recovery.  Total  Community invest-
ment in  new dwellings thus showed the lowest 
growth of the three  sectors,  rising  in  value  by 
only  10.8  per  cent  in  1974.  This  compares 
with an  expansion  averaging  16.7  per  cent  in 
the  19 71-7  3  period,  a  time  when  price  infla-
tion  was  less  significant. 
The performance at current prices of individual 
sectors  can  best  be  seen  in  Chart II  on 
page 11.  In  Belgium  and  Italy  which  led  the 
way  with  substantial  increases  in  the  overall 
volume  of  fixed  investment  in  1974,  there 
were very large  rises  in  the amounts spent on 
business and  housing investment with relative-
ly little change in  those spent by public author-
ities. The volume of fixed investment also rose, 
if  by  rather  less,  in  France  but  here  the 
increase  in  investment  expenditure  was  much 
more  balanced.  Similarly  in  the  United  King-
dom and  Ireland  the growth of capital  expen-
ditures  in  terms  of  current  prices  was  fairly 
evenly balanced  as  between sectors though, in 
contrast to France,  the total volume of invest-
ment had  begun  to fall. 
In  the Netherlands, Germany and  Denmark the 
volume  of  fixed  investment  fell  even  more 
sharply  in  total.  These  three  countries  shared 
the  experience  of  seeing  amounts  spent  on 
housing  fall  in  1974.  In  Germany  investment 
expenditures  by  enterprises  also  fell  but  this 
was counterbalanced  by higher capital  spend-
ing  on  the  part of public  authorities. 
For  example  in  Belgium,  investment  by  busi-
ness  enterprises  was  encouraged  last  year  by 
the  good  profit  position,  the  capacity  shor-
Table 2 - Gross fixed investment in the Community: by sector (1) 
In milliard units of account at current prices  % share of total 
Sectors 
1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  in  1969  in  1974 
Business investment  75.5  89.7  99.5  107.1  119.2  134.6  59.9%  59.4% 
Housing  31.1  34.3  38.0  44.7  51.8  57.4  24.7%  25.4% 
Investment by public authorities  19.4  23.3  25.2  27.0  29.3  34.4  15.4%  15.2% 
Total Community  126.0  147.3  162.7  178.8  200.3  226.4  100%  100% 
(1)  The statistics for 1974 are estimates of orders of magnitude. 10 
tages,  the  need  to develop  alternative  energy 
sources and the desire to forestall higher prices 
for  investment  goods  in  the  future.  Thus  the 
value  of capital  expenditures  by the  manufac-
turing  industries rose  by about 34 per  cent  in 
197  4 compared with 14.6 per cent in  the pre-
vious year.  In  the finance  and  distribution  sec-
tors  fixed  capital  investment  gained  about  13 
per  cent  last  year  in  contrast  to  a  decline  in 
1973.  However, the development of non-resi-
dential construction appears to have been  con-
strained  by the controls  on  large  buildings  in-
stituted  in  the  third  quarter of the  year. 
As  regards  new housing  construction,  howev-
er,  the  speculative  influences  backed  by  the 
rise  in  money incomes in  1973 and  1974 en-
couraged  an  increase  in  volume  of about  14 
per  cent  last  year  with  most of this  gain  oc-
curring  before  the  late  summer.  Again  owing 
to speculative influences residential  investment 
experienced a relatively high rate of price infla-
tion  of about  20 per  cent  in  197  4  which  led 
to its increasing  in  value  by  34 per  cent.  The 
trend  was reversed  from  September onwards, 
when  the  number  of starts  on  new  housing 
units dipped  below year  earlier  figures  largely 
as  a result of the restrictions placed by the au-
thorities  at  mid-year  on  the  availability  of 
mortgage funds and  of the steep  rise  in  inter-
est  rates  at that  time. 
Public  authority  capital  expenditures  in  1974 
were restrained,  as  in  the previous year,  by an 
anti-inflationary  budgetary  policy  and  the  vol-
ume  of expenditures  declined  for  the  second 
year  in  succession.  More  particularly,  capital 
expenditures  by  the  Belgian  public  authorities 
were limited to about 80 per cent of those ori-
ginally  planned  for  197  4.  At  the  end  of  the 
year,  however,  the  rising  trend  of  unemploy-
ment and  the  prospect of further weakness  in 
certain key industries and  in  international trade, 
led  the  public  authorities  to  introduce  meas-
ures  designed  to increase  public sector invest-
ment in  1975. 
In Italy,  business investment in  early  1974 was 
influenced in  much the same manner as  in  Bel-
gium  by the carry-over effect from  the  boom 
conditions  prevailing  in  the  previous  year. 
However,  after the first few months of  197  4 
industrial  production  turned  downwards  as 
confidence  was  undermined.  The  volume  of 
domestic sales  was even  more sharply curtail-
ed,  in  part  the  result  of  the  rise  in  indirect 
taxes,  higher  petrol  prices  and  other  fiscal 
measures  introduced  in  July,  and  a substantial 
build-up of finished  product stocks resulted  in 
the period from August onwards. This process 
effectively  discouraged  plant  expansion  and 
hence  led  to  a  reassessment  of  business  in-
vestment  plans  but  mostly too  late  to  affect 
the  year's  statistics. 
Thus  for  1974 as  a  whole  there  was  an  in-
crease in  the volume of business investment of 
about  6  per  cent,  Italy  being  one  of the  few 
Community  countries  in  which  the  growth of 
business investment in  volume terms exceeded 
that of the economy as  a whole.  The value of 
business capital expenditures, boosted by price 
inflation,  rose  by  34 per  cent.  The  very  large 
rise  in  prices created some problems for the fi-
nancing of investment at a time when a 15 per 
cent limit was placed  on  the annual growth of 
credit.  These  problems  were  however  taken 
into  account  in  the  renewal  of the  obligation 
on  banks  to hold  a certain  proportion of their 
portfolios in  bonds issued  by specialised finan-
cial  institutions. 
Residential  investment  in  Italy  experienced  a 
somewhat  similar  pattern  as  that of business 
investment,  with higher  activity in  early  197  4 
followed  by  a  contraction  later  in  the  year. 
Housing  starts  had  increased  rapidly  in  1973 
(particularly in the fourth quarter) after a period 
of  weakness  and  this  provided  the  basis  for 
the modest increase of 4. 7 per cent in  the vol-
ume of residential construction last year which 
was accompanied  by a rise  of almost  39 per 
cent in  value.  The trend of new housing starts, 
however, began to weaken and in  the first nine 
months  of  last  year  they  were  16  per  cent 
lower than  in  the comparable  period  of  1973. 
Credit restrictions in  force during the year bore 
heavily  on  the  personal  sector  and  no  doubt 
limited the availability of finance for new house 
construction.  Falling  real  incomes  and  rising 
construction  costs  were  a  further  source  of discouragement,  particularly  towards  the  end 
of  1974. 
The  commitment  of  the  government  to  res-
train  public expenditures and  to limit the bud-
getary  deficit  to  less  than  Lit.  9 200  milliard 
seems  to  have  contributed  to  the  decline  in 
public sector investment last year.  The volume 
of public  sector  capital  investment  in  Italy  in 
1974 accordingly continued its downward ten-
dency  of recent  years.  But  as  evidence  accu-
mulated  in  late  1974 and  early  1975 on  the 
growing recession  of the economy, and  partic-
ularly  in  the  investment sector,  it became  evi-
dent that some selective relaxation of the tight 
monetary  and  fiscal  policies  might  be  appro-
priate in  view of the weaker state of the econ-
omy.  Thus  in  early  1975 a  package  of fiscal 
measures  was  introduced,  including  some  in-
tended  to directly stimulate  public  investment 
expenditures. 
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Expenditure  on  fixed  investment in  197  4  was 
more  balanced  in  France  than  in  Belgium  and 
Italy,  though  the  influences  operating  in  each 
sector  were  different.  During  the  first  half  of 
the year there was a lively demand by the bu-
siness  sector  for  machinery  and  equipment  in 
response to the economic conditions prevailing 
at  that  time.  As  this  Jed  to a  more  rapid  in-
crease  than  usual  in  imports of capital  goods, 
it was necessary to redeploy the economic ef-
fort of the country in  such  a way as  to mod-
erate  demand  for  such  imports  and  at  the 
same time to allow capital goods producing in-
dustries  to channel  more  of their  output  into 
exports  and  to cater  for  the  needs  of invest-
ment in  new sources of energy.  The  reduction 
at mid-year in  the availability of credit was di-
rected towards this end.  Subsequently, the de-
teriorating  economic  outlook  also  served  to 
discourage  investment.  By  the  fourth  quarter 
of last  year  sales  and  output were falling  in  a 
Chart  II  - Elements  of gross  fixed  investment (1) 
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number of key industries such  as  those for au-
tomotive,  steel,  textile,  chemical  and  rubber 
products.  Not  only  were  plans  for  future  in-
vestment  affected  but  existing  projects,  such 
as  in  the  property  sector,  suffered  from  the 
cost of finance and  speculative expectations of 
a  high  net  return  on  leasing  building  space 
were  undermined. 
The volume of investment by public sector en-
terprises  was,  however,  more  affected  than 
that  of  the  private  sector,  partly  because  of 
governmental  policies  of  direct  restraint  and 
partly because of the impact of the overall lim-
itation of budgetary expenditure  on  purchases 
of capital equipment during a period of rapidly 
rising  prices. The out-turn for 197  4 as a whole 
was  not unimpressive  in  these  circumstances. 
Expenditure on  fixed  investment by non-finan-
cial  enterprises,  including  those  of  the  public 
sector, rose  by 2.8 per cent in  volume and  by 
18.6  per  cent  in  value. 
A broadly similar pattern occurred in  residential 
investment  in  France  which  rose  by  0.4  per 
cent  in  volume  last year and  by  20.5 per  cent 
at current prices.  In  the first half of 1974 spe-
culative  influences associated  with a  desire  to 
acquire physical assets in  a time of uncertainty 
contributed to the fairly large number of hous-
ing  starts during this period  which  in  turn  as-
sured  a modest growth in  the residential  con-
struction  industry.  The  housing  market  was, 
however,  affected  by  the  high  cost  of mort-
gages and  the number of dwellings commenc-
ed  fell  sharply  in  the  fourth  quarter. 
The increased emphasis on  social  programmes 
in  France  last  year  probably  had  a  minor  in-
fluence on  public sector investment. Capital ex-
penditures  by  central  and  local  governments 
seem  to  have  been  less  affected  by  the  cut-
back  in  budget  expenditure  at  mid-year  than 
public  sector  enterprises  and  they  conse-
quently rose by 2. 7 per cent in  volume and  by 
18.2 per  cent  in  value  or  by only slightly  less 
than  the  whole  business  sector. 
However,  in  Luxembourg  not  all  the  sectors 
participated  equally  in  the  modest  increase  in 
the value  of capital  investment in  1974. Busi-
ness investment suffered a check in  the face of 
lowered expectations of future economic activ-
ity,  declining  by  about  8  per  cent  in  value 
terms. A principal factor in  this decline was the 
reduction in  investment by the steel industry of 
about  12  per  cent  compared  with  1973.  Ca-
pital  expenditures by the new non-steel  indus-
tries declined  as  a result  of the termination  of 
many  of recent  plant  expansion  programmes. 
New residential  construction was adversely af-
fected  by  the  restrictions  on  mortgage  credit 
imposed  in  mid-1973. Speculative demand in-
fluences  took some  while to diminish  but the 
number  of  new  permits  for  residential  con-
struction declined on  a year-on-year basis from 
the second  quarter onwards, and  for  197  4  as 
a whole they were 7 per cent lower. The index 
of construction  activity,  comprising  both  resi-
dential  and  non-residential  sectors,  was 7  per 
cent higher on  average  in  1974 than  in  1973. 
Investment  by  the  Luxembourg  public  sector 
was appreciably higher last year in value terms, 
mainly as  a result  of the expanded  road-build-
ing  programme  and  other  infrastructural  ex-
penditures. 
In contrast to the first three countries mention-
ed  above  in  detail,  the United Kingdom  exper-
ienced  an  overall  fall  in  the  volume of invest-
ment. This fall  was,  however, unevenly distrib-
uted.  Within the  business  sector,  manufactur-
ing  capital  expenditures  performed  well,  rising 
in  volume by  10.8 per  cent last  year.  A  num-
ber  of  manufacturing  industries  (the  automa-
tive  trades  excepted)  experienced  good  sales 
both  domestically  and  abroad  and,  financial 
considerations  apart,  were  in  a  good  position 
to extend  capacity.  However,  the  service  and 
distribution  industries,  and  more  particularly 
the  transport and  property sectors,  were very 
conscious of troubled economic circumstances 
and  capital  investment  declined  in  volume  by 
6.7  per  cent  in  1974.  Total  business  capital 
expenditures  in  the  United  Kingdom  rose  in 
volume by  0.3 per  cent and  by  18.1  per  cent 
in  current prices.  Capital expenditures by public 
corporations provided much of the support for 
this  level  of  activity  in  increasing  by  7.6  per 
cent in  volume terms. Investment in  the private 13 
Table 3-The share of capital investment in the economies of the Community countries (1) 
Gross fixed investment 
Gross 
national  Sector shares in  % 
Countries  product  As% of 
at current  gross  Invest-
market  national  Investments  Housing  ments 
prices  product  by  construe- by public  Total 
enterprises  tion  authorities 
Germany,  DM  milliards  1973  916.9  25  60  26  14  100 
1974  980.9  23  59  24  17  100 
France,  FF  milliards  1973  1 108.1  24  61  27  12  100 
1974  1 281.0  25  61  27  12  100 
United  Kingdom,  £  millions 1973  72 315  19  61  21  18  100 
1974  81  927  20  63  20  17  100 
Italy,  Lit.  milliards  1973  80963  21  57  30  13  100 
1974  97 182  23  57  31  12  100 
Netherlands,  Fl.  milliards  1973  166.48  23  56  28  16  100 
1974  187.04  22  58  26  16  100 
Belgium,  BF  milliards  1973  1 767.6  22  59  24  17  100 
1974  2 069.4  23  60  26  14  100 
Denmark,  Kr.  milliards  1973  164.56  23  52  28  20  100 
1974  183.71  22  55  25  20  100 
Ireland,  £  millions  1973  2 651  24  34  26  40(2  100 
1974  2 879  25  33  26  41  (2  100 
Luxembourg,  Flux.  milliards 1973  71.44  28  ·60  21  19  100 
1974  82.82  26  53  24  23  100 
Total Community, 
u.a.  milliards  1973  840.2  23  60  26  14  100 
1974  920.4  23  60  25  15  100 
(  1)  The table is based on estimates, at current prices, of orders of magnitude. In a strict sense, comparisons of gross 
fixed investment cannot be made because of differences of definition and composition from one member country 
to another. 
(2)  Includes some element of fixed investment by semi-State corporations. 
enterprise  sector  slackened  somewhat  in  the 
fourth  quarter of the  year  in  resr>onse  to  the 
slowing  of the  economy at that time and  the 
difficulties of financing increased working capi-
tal  requirements. 
Housing  investment  was  also  mixed,  private 
residential  housing  declining sharply compared 
with  1973,  while  local  authority  housing  ex-
panded  rapidly  as  a  counterbalance.  The  pri-
vate  housing  sector  in  the  United  Kingdom 
was  depressed  in  1974.  Demand  for  new 
houses was slack, mortgage finance was costly 
and,  in  the first half of the year, difficult to ob-
tain.  From the builders'  viewpoint construction 
costs  of  new. housing  had  continued  to  in-
crease  rapidly  but at  the same  time the stock 
of  unsold  homes  depressed  the  market,  and, 
with high  interest charges on  borrowings, pro-
fitability  was  often  pared  to  vanishing  point. 
Private  sector  housing  started  during  1974 
was down 5 1 per cent from the previous year 
while total  new private sector  housing  invest-
ment  in  the  United  Kingdom  declined  in  vol-
ume  by  20.5 per  cent.  Even  at current  prices 
capital investment in  private sector housing de-
clined  by  4.8  per  cent. 
Public  sector  housing  was increased  energeti-
cally last year in the United Kingdom as  an  ele-
ment of government  policy.  While public  sec-
tor  housing  starts  rose  by  30. 1  per  cent  this 
was  not  immediately  translated  into  a  corre-
sponding  rise  in  the  volume  of  investment, 
which  in  the  event  increased  12.4  per  cent. 14 
Public  sector  non-residential  capital  expendi-
tures  declined  by  8  per  cent  in  volume  last 
year.  In  this context the relatively large govern-
ment  expenditure  cuts  announced  in  1973 
started  to be  reflected  in  the investment  pro-
gramme.  On  the  other  hand,  in  terms of cur-
rent  prices  public  sector  investment  increased 
at a rate similar to that of the other two main 
sectors. 
The  public  sector  apart,  the  behaviour  of  in-
vestment in  Ireland in  1974 bore some resem-
blance  to that  in  the  United  Kingdom.  Invest-
ment by the business sector rose  by about  18 
per cent at current prices last year mainly as  a 
result  of higher  machinery and  equipment  ex-
penditures. Imports of producers' capital goods 
which  are  indicative  of  investment  perfor-
mance,  rose  by  an  estimated  25  per  cent  in 
value terms.  Non-residential business construc-
tion,  however,  was perhaps  more affected  by 
the unsettled business environment, with long-
term  prospects  clouded  by rising  inflation. 
The  pattern  of expenditure on  residential  con-
struction was mixed.  Investment in  housing by 
the  private  sector  was  reduced  last  year  in 
constant price  terms,  as  a result  of difficulties 
which  the  Building  Societies  in  Ireland  exper-
ienced in  attracting funds. Any reduction, how-
ever,  was  more  than  compensated  by  the 
sharp  increase  in  public authority expenditures 
on  dwellings, the value  of which rose  by over 
30 per cent  last  year.  Total  residential  invest-
ment increased  almost 23 per cent in  value  in 
1974. 
The  value  of Irish  public  authority  i_nvestment 
(excluding  housing) expanded  by an  estimated 
23 per  cent last year  although  direct compar-
isons  with  1973 are  not possible  owing to a 
change  in  the  financial  year.  The  central  gov-
ernment pursued an  actively stimulative invest-
ment policy in  1974 which was reflected  in  a 
higher  borrowing  requirement.  Local  authority 
capital  expenditures (excluding  housing),  which 
are almost entirely financed by the central gov-
ernment,  did not increase  to the same  extent. 
The  pattern  of investment  expenditure  in  the 
Netherlands in  1974 was more uneven than  in 
the  United  Kingdom  and  Ireland  as  the  busi-
ness  sector did  not share  in  the fall  in  the vo-
lume of fixed capital formation. A  certain  ben-
efit  accrued  to enterprises  in  the  Netherlands 
last  year  from  the  re-introduction  of  invest-
ment  allowances  for  tax  purposes,  and  this 
factor, together with new energy diversification 
projects,  no doubt maintained business  invest-
ment on a higher plane than might have other-
wise  been  the  case.  Capital  expenditures  by 
private and  public  enterprises  were nevertheless 
retarded  initially by the uncertainties of the  oil 
crisis.  However, as  it became clear that supply 
problems  were  less  acute  than  feared,  there 
was an  element of catching  up in  the summer 
period  and,  in  1974 as  a  whole,  the  value  of 
business capital expenditures increased by over 
eleven  per  cent  while  in  real  terms there  was 
virtually no change.  Because  of the rising  cost 
of  labour  the  private  sector  resorted  to  dee-
pening its investment in  capital equipment. Ex-
penditures  on  new machinery  and  equipment 
were little affected by the economic slowdown 
but,  in  terms  of volume,  investment  in  build-
ings  declined,  partly  for  cyclical  reasons  but 
also  because  of  the  persistence  of a  secular 
downtrend.  In  an  attempt  to  counteract  this, 
further  tax  incentives  on  investment  on  new 
buildings were introduced in  the fourth quarter 
of last  year. 
The  demand  for  housing  in  the  Netherlands 
appeared  to be  nearing  satiation  in  197  4  and 
it was not altogether unexpected that expendi-
ture on  new dwellings was  13 per  cent lower 
in  volume terms than  in  the previous year.  The 
rise  in  mortgage interest  rates  to a very  high 
level  by the third quarter of last  year  was not 
a major factor but it may have had a marginal 
effect  upon  private  unsubsidised  housing  in 
that plans for building  may have  been  delayed 
in  the hope that interest rates would soon  fall. 
It  seems  that  as  housing  completions  appre-
ciably  exceeded  starts  during  the  fifteen 
months  to  end-1974,  thus  depleting  the 
amount of work in  progress,  the  reduction  in 
building activity may have continued into early 
1975. To meet this problem, the  Dutch public 
authorities announced in  October of last year a 
revised programme of subsidies for housing, to take  into  account  higher  mortgage  rates  and 
the  inflation  of land  and  building  costs. 
The  public  authorities in  the  Netherlands  have 
pursued  for  some  years  a  policy  of  limiting 
their  total  expenditures  to the  volume  of re-
sources available after the demands of the pri-
vate  sector  and  the  balance  of payments  had 
been  met.  In  implementing  this  policy  it  has 
proved easier to restrict the public sectors' ca-
pital  investment  than  its  current  expenditure. 
There has  thus been  a secular decline in  public 
investment  over  the  last  few  years  and,  al-
though  short-term  programmes  of  public 
works have been  introduced to combat unem-
ployment.  the  total  of Dutch  public  sector  in-
vestment continued to fall  last year.  The  mea-
sures  introduced towards the end  of  197  4  to 
counteract  the  rise  in  unemployment  and  the 
economic  slowdown  that  was  then  occurring 
were  designed  to stimulate  investment  in  the 
public as  well  as  the private sector.  Neverthe-
less  total  capital  expenditures  by  central  and 
local  government  in  1974 were  19  per  cent 
lower in  real  terms than  six  years  previously. 
The pattern of investment in  Germany in  1974 
was also  uneven.  Certain  aspects of construc-
tion  activity,  particularly  new  housing,  were 
distinctly weak in  the first half of  1974. New 
dwelling  construction  was  affected  by  the 
downswing in  the economic cycle,  as  evidenc-
ed  by the ending of the property boom of the 
early part of the decade, and the large stock of 
unsold houses.  Higher interest rates  tended  to 
delay any resurgence in  private residential  c~n­
struction and as  a result the value of new con-
struction  declined  in  1974 by  10.5  per  cent 
from a year earlier. To counter this slackness in 
private  sector  dwelling  construction  the  Ger-
man  public  authorities  inaugurated  pro-
grammes  to  increase  the  numbers  of houses 
erected  with government  assistance. 
A  similar  pattern  was  evident  in  private  non-
residential building. The hesitancy of private in-
dustry in  placing  orders for new capacity,  was 
compensated to a large  extent by a sharp  ex-
pansion  in  building  and  civil  engineering  pro-
jects by the German public authorities, many of 
which  were  acting  under  various  special  pro-
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grammes  designed  to  offset  slackening  de-
mand.  The  value  of total  public  sector  capital 
expenditures  increased  by  20.2  per  cent  last 
year. 
Capital  expenditures  on  machinery and  equip-
ment by  the  German  business  sector  declined 
in  1974, by about 2.9 per cent in  value and  by 
about  9  per  cent  in  volume  terms.  These  fig-
ures reflect the slackening  of demand combin-
ed  with what was.  by international  standards, 
a  relatively  low  rate  of  price  inflation  during 
the  year,  a consequence  of which  was a nar-
rowing of profit margins. The declining trend in 
investment  in  new  machinery  and  equipment 
was closely  related  to the state of industry as 
a whole. A number of industries such as motor 
vehicles  and  construction  were  adversely  af-
fected  by  economic  circumstances  from  the 
beginning  of the year  and  later,  in  the second 
half  of  1974, the  chemical,  textiles  and  steel 
industries  suffered  a  reduction  in  sales,  thus 
adversely  affecting orders for new equipment. 
The very strong export order book formed the 
mainstay for the  industries concerned  (provid-
ing  some support for certain  suppliers  of new 
equipment) but, to~ards the closing months of 
the year,  even  the export sector saw a decline 
in  orders  relative  to  those  received  earlier  in 
1974.  Total  non-residential  business  invest-
ment  in  Germany,  comprising  both  new con-
struction  and  equipment declined  by 9.6  per 
cent  in  value  terms  last  year. 
Investment patterns in  Denmark in  1974 bore 
more resemblance to those  in  the Netherlands 
than  in  Germany.  Capital  expenditures  by  the 
business sector constituted one of the stronger 
elements  in  the  overall  investment scene  dur-
ing  the first half of the year.  During  this  early 
period investments by private and public enter-
prises  were  stimulated  by  the  carry-over  of 
orders from  1973, the quite strong  pattern  of 
industrial  production,  the  need  to  expand  ca-
pacity following the  1973 boom, and the good 
profit  position  of a  number  of sectors  of the 
economy,  particularly  agriculture.  During  the 
latter half of the year,  however. business capi-
tal  expenditures  slackened  as  a  result  of  the 
downturn in  the  economy as  a whole.  Invest-16 
ments  in  new buildings  and  similar  construc-
tion  work having  long  lead  times before com-
pletion,  seem  on  the  other hand  to have  been 
less  affected  by  the  sudden  slowing  in  busi-
ness  activity  than  investments  in  machinery 
and equipment, especially transportation equip-
ment. Thus,  in  the year  1974, Danish  business 
investment declined  by 2.4 per  cent in  volume 
following  a  14.6 per  cent  gain  in  1973. Price 
inflation  contributed  to  raising  its  value  by 
about  14.4  per  cent  in  197  4. 
Housing  investment  in  Denmark  was  hard  hit 
by the very high cost of mortgage finance pre-
vailing  for most of the year,  and  by the after-
math  of  the  1972 and  1973 building  boom 
which  left  a  large  stock  of  unsold  houses. 
These  factors  coincided  with  a  downturn  in 
consumer confidence and uncertainty as to the 
employment situation,  resulting  in  a sharp  re-
duction of about 25 per cent in  the volume of 
housing  investment  in  1974.  The  depressed 
state  of residential  construction  is  made  even 
clearer by the continual decline in  each  quarter 
of  last  year  in  the  number  of  dwelling  units 
started.  For  197  4  as  a  whole  the  number  of 
dwelling units started in  Denmark was reduced 
to only 25 708 units compared with a  ~otal of 
50 399  units  started  in  the  previous  year.  In 
contrast,  housing  completions  totalled  48 595 
units  in  197  4. 
Public  authority  capital  expenditures  were 
sharply curtailed last year as a result of the de-
liberate  policy  in  Denmark  of halting  govern-
ment  building  and  public  works  construction. 
This  limitation  which  lasted  from  April  until 
August of last year for local  governments, and 
until October for the national government, was 
a reflection both of the long-standing desire to 
restrain the role of government in  the economy 
and of the need  to give force to anti-inflation-
ary  policies  which  were  introduced  at  that 
time. As a result of this enforced halt on  public 
authority  construction  in  Denmark  for a  good 
part of the year, the volume of government ca-
pital  expenditures for  197  4  was about  14 per 
cent  lower than  in  the  previous year,  continu-
ing  the  declining  trend  evident  since  1971. 
Following  the  resumption  of  public  authority 
construction  activity  towards  the  third  and 
fourth quarters of last year, it would seem that 
capital  expenditures  by the  government might 
well increase quite considerably in  1975, com-
pared  with  the  level  of  activity  evident  in 
mid-1974. 
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CHAPTER  2 
FINANCING  OF  INVESTMENT 
2.1.  THE  FINANCIAL  SETTING 
At the  beginning  of  197  4  national  authorities 
were  confronted  with  the  need  to  overcome 
the serious problems of inflation and of adjust-
ment to the sharp increase in  petroleum prices 
demanded  by  oil  exporting  countries.  In  the 
main  the  first  of these  problems  was  tackled 
by the introduction of measures to reduce  the 
availability  of credit  in  order to bring  about  a 
slackening of demand and of pressures exerted 
on  prices by rising  costs.  Apart from relatively 
minor cutbacks  in  consumption,  the  main  ap-
proach to the second of these problems adopt-
ed  by countries likely to be in  heavy deficit on 
current  account  in  their  balance  of payments, 
was to seek to borrow substantial sums on  the 
international  capital  market. 
Both these policies had an  inevitable impact on 
capital  markets. The first of these resulted in  a 
rise  in  short-term interest rates on  national ca-
pital  markets through the operation of restric-
tive monetary policies.  The second on  the oth-
er  hand,  helped  to  sustain,  and  possibly  to 
raise,  interest rates on short-term eurocurrency 
markets  from  which  the  banking  syndicates 
extending the large scale credits drew their re-
sources.  The  high  rates  of  interest  available 
on  eurocurrency  deposits  certainly  attracted 
the  surplus  revenues  earned  by  oil  exporting 
countries  and  probably  were  a  contributory 
cause from time to time of shortages of liquid-
ity on  national  money  markets. 
Long-term capital  markets in  fixed  interest se-
curities  suffered  from  the  upsurge  in  short-
term interest rates on  the international  market 
and  on  national  markets which in  a number of 
instances  resulted  in  the appearance  of a rev-
erse  yield  gap  with  short  -term  rates  higher 
than  long.  As  the  prevailing  rates  of  inflation 
mostly exceeded the yield on long-term invest-
ments,  bond  markets  looked  decidedly  unat-
tractive for a  large  part of  197  4.  Movements 
out of long-term securities into short-term pla-
cements undoubtedly took place with a conse-
quent increase  in  long-term rates but possibil-
ities  for  such  rearrangements  of  portfolios 
were  limited  by the  capital  losses  that  would 
have  been  involved.  The  rise  in  long-term 
yields  was,  however,  sufficient  to  discourage 
new borrowing. 
New issues  of shares  also  suffered.  Additional 
difficulties  in  share  markets  were  the  uncer-
tainty over ·the  profitability of enterprises in  an 
inflationary climate and  the unmistakable signs 
of an  impending  recession  which  became  ap-
parent  from  mid-year  onwards. 
As  the  threat  of recession  grew,  official  poli-
cies  changed  direction.  This  occurred  largely 
during the early autumn and by the last quarter 
of the year  interest rates  were turning  down-
wards  in  most member countries  and  activity 
on  capital  markets was beginning  to  revive. 
The  improvement  in  monetary  conditions  to-
wards the end of 1974 was so marked in  Ger-
many,  the  Netherlands,  Belgium  and  Luxem-
bourg  that  prevailing  long-term  interest  rates 
ended the year more or less where they began 
(see  Chart 3).  In  Denmark  and  France  there 
was  a  marked  decline  in  interest  rates  from 
mid-year onwards but they remained a percen-
tage point or two higher at the end of the year 
than at the beginning. On  the other hand in  the 
United  Kingdom,  Ireland  and  Italy  where  the 
problems of inflation  and  current  account  de-
ficits were more acute  for a  large  part  of the 
year  than  elsewhere,  the  cost  of  borrowing 
continued  to rise  virtually  to the  year's  end. 
While  in  the  early  months  of  last  year  there 
was a continuation of the relatively tight credit 
policies instituted in Germany in  1973, towards 
the  summer  there  was  some  easing  of  this 
policy, which became more pronounced in  res-18 
ponse to liquidity problems caused  by the out-
flow  of  capital  in  the  third  quarter.  Finally, 
from  October  onwards,  there  was  a  distinct 
shift of emphasis in  monetary policy aimed  at 
countering  the  gathering  recession  of  the 
economy and the mounting numbers of unem-
ployed. 
The  success  in  reducing  price  inflation  in  Ger-
many  was  attributable  not  only  to  a  gradual 
weakening  of demand but also  to special  fac-
tors working in  favour of a limitation of price 
increases.  The  increase  in  the  cost  of  living 
over  a  span  of  twelve  months  was  7.4  per 
cent  at  the  beginning  of  last  year;  by 
end-197  4  the  annual  increase  in  prices  was 
down  to  less  than  6  per  cent-the lowest  in 
the Community. Two special factors contribut-
ed  to this performance; the decline in  the pro-
ducer  prices  of a  number of food  items con-
tained  in  the  cost  of living  index,  and  the  in-
crease  in  the  external  value  of the  Deutsche-
mark,  especially  towards  the  end  of  197  4, 
which helped to offset the rate of price  infla-
tion  of imported products.  On  the other hand, 
the control over inflation was not helped  by a 
faster  rise  in  wage rates  in  19  7 4  than  during 
the  previous  year,  which  thereby  placed  a 
squeeze  on  profit margins. 
In  the first half of 1974, however, the overrid-
ing  aim  of  the  German  monetary  authorities 
was to stabilise the economy in  the face  of a 
rising  rate of wage inflation and the exigencies 
of  the  oil  crisis.  The  money  supply  on  a 
broadly  defined  basis  (M2  corrected  for 
changes in  the composition of reporting banks) 
rose  by 7.9 per  cent between June  1973 and 
June  197  4,  which compared  with an  increase 
of  18 per cent in  the previous  12 month peri-
od.  The intent of credit policy continued to be 
oriented  in  the  summer  months towards pro-
ducing  stability,  although  by this  time the  de-
mand  for  credit  was  slackening.  The  existing 
restrictions  consequently  did  not  appear  to 
need  tightening.  The  Bundesbank  was  con-
cerned  primarily  with  compensating  for  the 
drain  on  liquidity  which  resulted  largely  from 
capital  outflows  by  offering  unlimited  "lom-
bard" loan  facilities and lowering the minimum 
reserve  ratios on the banks'  domestic liabilities 
(in  September).  Also  in  September the  Barde-
pot  reserve  requirements  on  funds  borrowed 
abroad  was  lifted. 
At least some of the liquidity problems suffer-
ed  by  banks  (especially  smaller  banks)  during 
the summer period were attributable to the af-
termath  of  the  failure  of  the  Herstatt  Bank. 
Aside  from  taking  measures  of a general  nat-
ure to ease  liquidity problems, the Bundesbank 
also  established,  in  conjunction  with  members 
of the  banking  community,  a  "Liquidity  Con-
sortium Bank" to provide assistance to any es-
sentially  sound  credit  institution  which  might 
find  itself  in  difficulties.  The  Bundesbank  was 
particularly concerned with preventing a gener-
al  loss  of confidence  in  the  banking  system. 
In  the final  quarter of  1974, there  was a rev-
ersal  of many of the  trends  evident  earlier  in 
the year.  Not only was there a revival  of large 
capital  inflows-and a  sharp  strengthening  of 
the  Deutschemark  exchange  rate-but also  a 
rapid  increase  in  the money supply and  in  the 
free liquid reserves of the banks.  Between end-
August  and  end-December  of  last  year  the 
broadly defined money supply (M2) rose by 6.2 
per cent, although at least part of this rapid ex-
pansion  was  due  to seasonal  factors.  Interest , 
rates in  Germany in  1974 assumed a divergent 
pattern,  with  short-term  money  market  rates 
declining  steeply  for  most  of  the  year  from 
their  1973  peaks,  while  yields  on  long-term 
bonds  rose  during  the first  six  months before 
declining  late  in  the  year.  Rates  on  three-
month  inter-bank  loans  declined  from  13.20 
per  cent  in  December  of  1973  to  8.60  per 
cent  in  December of last year.  This very rapid 
downward movement, and  the lower yields on 
domestic bonds compared with those on  most 
bonds  quoted  internationally,  contributed  to 
the outflow of capital  during  the late summer. 
In  the Netherlands,  unlike in  many other coun-
tries,  there  was a  relatively  full  flow of credit 
available for financing investment last year-al-
beit at high  interest rates  especially  in  the se-
cond  and  third  quarters-as  monetary  policy 
adjusted towards easing the impact of reduced 
economic activity. The  restrictions which were 
introduced  in  1973 to counteract  speculation against  the  guilder and  the possible  impact of 
the oil crisis began to be eased  in  1974. These 
relaxations had  no internal effect. For example, 
the  Nederlandsche  Bank  was  able,  in  the  ab-
sence  of  incentives  for  foreign  investors  to 
place  their  funds  in  securities  denominated  in 
guilders, to abolish  the "0-guilder" regulations 
whi'ch  had  prevented  foreign  capital  from 
reaching  the  domestic  bond  market. 
Dutch policy regarding wages was designed to 
ensure that lower income groups did not suffer 
any reduction of real  earnings from the effects 
of the oil  crisis.  This involved some element of 
redistribution of incomes. The  price controls in 
force  during  the  year  were  intended,  on  the 
other hand, to limit and delay the impact of in-
flation.  Enterprises  consequently  found  them-
selves faced with the serious problem of rising 
wage payments and  a limitation  on  the  prices 
they  were allowed  to charge,  which  thus  cul-
minated  in  a  squeeze  on  their  profit  margins. 
Capital  markets  within  the  Belgian I Luxem-
bourg  monetary union  were also  beginning  to 
surmount  their  difficulties  by  end-197  4.  The 
principal  emphasis  of  the  Belgian  authorities' 
anti-inflation policy last year  was on  monetary 
rather  than  fiscal  policy.  At  the  beginning  of 
1974  there  was  some  uncertainty  as  to  the 
possible  effects  of  the  oil  crisis  and  conse-
quently  a  flexible  attitude  was  adopted  to-
wards credit policy.  By March, however, it was 
clear that this approach was doing little to curb 
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the  rate  of credit  expansion  and,  with  effect 
from  April  1,  a  credit  ceiling  was  introduced 
which  was  in  force  for  the  rest  of the  year, 
having  been  considerably  toughened  in  June. 
Monetary  policy  was  also  aimed  at  lessening 
speculative activities and, with this in  mind, the 
Belgian  authorities acted to raise interest rates. 
While the official discount rate was only raised 
once,  in  February, from 7.75 to 8.75 per cent, 
various  measures  were  taken  to  apply  the 
higher  rates  on  the central  bank's special  loan 
facilities  to  a  broader  spectrum  of loan  busi-
ness.  Short-term  money  rates  climbed  up-
wards until late summer under the influence of 
a similar  movement in  other external  markets; 
the  three  month treasury  bill  rate  in  Belgium, 
which  in  January had  been  7.65 per cent,  av-
eraged  11.75 per cent during the months July-
September  and  subsequently  declined  to 
10.50 per  cent  only  in  December.  Long-term 
yields followed a similar pattern, those for gov-
ernment  bonds  rising  from  8. 14  per  cent  in 
January to 9.26 per  cent in  August before re-
ceding  to  9.03  per  cent  in  December. 
In  Luxembourg price inflation,  which was rela-
tively low in  1973, steadily worsened last year 
and consumer prices which had risen  at an  an-
nual  rate of only 6.8 per cent in  January  1974 
showed a rate of inflation of 11.2 per cent by 
year-end.  In  order  to  slow  the  expansion  of 
credit  and  to stimulate  saving,  the  public  au-
Table 4- Methods of financing the fixed investment of enterprises in the Community 
(Provisional) 
(Percentages) 
Annual 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  average 
1970-1974 
I.  Depreciation  46.5  47.2  47.6  47.4  50.7  47.9 
II.  Long  and  medium-term 
external  resources  raised  on 
national  capital  markets:  12.3  15.4  17.8  18.1  11.3  15.0 
of which:  shares  3.8  3.9  4.5  3.8  2.5  3.7 
bonds  8.5  11.5  13.3  14.3  8.8  11.3. 
Ill.  Other  resources  including 
net  self-financing  and,  bank 
and  other  credits  41.2  37.4  34.6  34.5  38.0  37.1 
Total  financing  for  gross  fixed 
capital  formation  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 20 
thorities  introduced  or  extended  measures  in 
July  and  August  to  restrict  mortgate  lending 
and  to raise  interest rates.  The  latter step  had 
the  dual  purpose  of encouraging  savings  (ini-
tially not very successfully) through higher sav-
ings  deposit  rates  and  discouraging  the  de-
mand for loans by a parallel  increase in  interest 
rates  on  loans. 
In  common  with  those  in  the  remaining  five 
Member Countries, financial markets and inter-
mediaries  in  Denmark  experienced  difficulties 
last  year  in  meeting  the  demand  for  invest-
ment funds in  the face of a stringent limitation 
on  the  availability  of credit  and  interest  rates 
consequently soared.  The authorities tightened 
monetary conditions during the first half of the 
year  both through a squeeze  on  bank liquidity 
and  by the simple expedient of not raising  the 
ceiling  on  bank lending  until August. The gov-
ernment also  introduced an  unusual  scheme  in 
February to dampen the effect on  prices of in-
creases  in  index-linked  labour  costs  by  reim-
bursing companies with a proportion of the in-
crease  they  were  compelled  to  bear.  On  the 
side of demand, a compulsory savings scheme 
for individuals was introduced and,  in  May,  in-
direct  taxes  were  increased.  Monetary  policy, 
however,  probably  contributed  more  than 
these  last  measures  towards reaching  the ob-
jectives of containing inflation and reducing the 
trade  deficit. 
Largely  as  a result of these  restrictive  policies, 
interest  rates  rose  steeply  until  mid-year;  the 
average yield  on  mortgage bonds on  the Dan-
ish  market  rose  from  13.78  per  cent  in  De-
cember  1973 to  17.68  per  cent  in  July  last 
year  before  retreating  to  14.54%  in  Decem-
ber. The stance of monetary policy was chang-
ed,  in  recognition of a weakening of the econ-
omy,  by  the  relaxation  of the  ceiling  on  bank 
lending  in  August and,  in  November,  this ceil-
ing had to be raised  again because of a further 
deterioration  in  the  business  outlook.  The  de-
cline  in  interest  rates  from  their  peak  in  July 
can  thus  be  ascribed  mainly  to  the  easing  of 
monetary policy (which  was  facilitated  by the 
general downtrend in  the same  period of inter-
est rates on  the international and other nation-
al  capital  markets)  but  the  underlying  reces-
sionary  tendency  of the  economy  also  played 
a  part. 
The  tight  monetary  policy  which  France  had 
been  experiencing  since  it  was  introduced  in 
late  1972 was  reinforced  at the  beginning  of 
1974.  The  monetary  authorities  tended  to 
operate on the level  and  composition of banks' 
reserves  as  a means  of achieving  interest  rate 
objectives which were an  important element in 
their anti-inflationary policy.  The situation  was 
complicated  by substantial  outflows of  c~pital 
in  a  bout  of  speculation  against  the  French 
franc  in  January  as  a  result  of which  the  re-
serve  requirement  on  non-resident  deposits 
was suppressed  in  an  effort to encourage  the 
funds to remain  in  the system and  so to prev-
ent  a  further  cost  to  the  overall  balance  of 
payments. 
As  a result of the general  restraint on  bank  li-
quidity  in  the  first  half  of  197  4,  the  whole 
structure of interest rates rose by between one 
and  two  percentage  points  from  the  end  of 
1973 to July  1974. At a  time when  inflation 
was eroding the real  value of capital there was 
a fear that saving would not be sufficiently en-
couraged  by  the interest  rates  on  offer at  the 
beginning  of the  year.  Similarly  it was judged 
that  higher  interest  rates  would  help  to 
discourage  the  speculative  activities  which 
were tending to add to inflationary pressures in 
the  first  half  of the  year.  On  the  other  hand, 
the indications are that genuine investment ac-
tivity suffered  in  the  latter part of  19  7  4  from 
a deterioration of the economic outlook rather 
than  the high  cost of borrowing. The  selective 
easing  of  monetary  policy'  in  the  closing 
months of the year  in  fact  led  to a decline  in 
some  market rates  of interest,  for example on 
bonds  issued  by· public  sector  or  semi-public 
sector  borrowers.  The  average  yield  on  long-
term bonds issued by private sector borrowers, 
however,  having  risen  from  9.83  per  cent  in 
December  1973  to  11.93  per  cent  in  June 
197  4  remained  close  to  that  figure  until  the 
years'  end. 
The  United  Kingdom  was  among  the  three 
countries  which  did  not  experience  an  im-
provement in  their  capital  markets  in  the final 
quarter of  197  4.  Business confidence was un-dermined early in  the year by the oil  crisis,  the 
miner's strike,  the resort  to a three-day work-
ing  week  and  growing  inflationary  pressures. 
Rapidly rising  costs of labour and  other inputs 
placed  s~vere  strains  on  company  finances 
during the  year.  The  search  for larger  nominal 
amounts for working  capital  and  fixed  invest-
ment  was  rendered  more  difficult by  reduced 
trading  profits (after  eliminating  windfall  gains 
from  stock  appreciation),  higher  costs  of bor-
rowing and higher tax liabilities.  In the property 
sector, on  the other hand,  it was a fall  in  pro-
perty  values  which  combined  with  higher 
charges  on  bank  borrowings  to  create  pro-
blems not only for the sector itself but also for 
the  banking  sector.  A  number  of the  smaller 
banks and finance houses encountered difficul-
ties  in  retaining  deposits owing  to their  often 
heavy  involvement  in  loans  to  the  property 
sector  at a time  when  confidence  had  gener-
ally  been  weakened.  To  remedy  the  situation 
the  Bank  of England  took active  steps  to or-
Table  5 - Financing of the non-government 
sector from the domestic market 
and banking sources 
(milliard  units  of account) 
Country  1971  1972  1973  1974 
Germany  23.37  30.60  27.70 24.72 
France  16.92  22.09  22.12  24.05 
United  Kingdom  9.96  21.97  21.23  13.80 
Italy  12.56  15.75  20.97  14.23 
Netherlands  3.68  5.17  6.71  8.10 
Belgium  2.05  3.03  3.40  3.47 
Denmark  1.99  2.77  3.50  3.06 
Ireland  -(8)  0.69  0.58  0.40 
luxembourg  -(b)  -(b)  0.18  0.28 
Total  Community  70.54(8)  102.08  106.39 92.11 
of which:  shares  4.36  5.04  5.39  3.83 
bonds  4.23  4.64  3.30  1.99 
short, medium and 
long-term  credits  61.95  92.40  97.70 86.29 
(8)  Following  an  industrial  dispute involving  the  ban-
king  system  in  Ireland,  statistical  material  with  res-
pect to  1971  is not available for this table in  a form 
comparable  with  later  years.  This  has  affected  the 
total for the  Community  to a certain  extent. 
(b)  Estimates  for early  years  are  incomplete. 
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ganise support for these smaller financial  inter-
mediaries. 
As regards tackling  the symptoms of inflation, 
the  U.K.  authorities  continued  to  control  the 
rise  in  prices through regulation  of profit mar-
gins  and  through  subsidies,  to  hold  down 
prices  on  basic  household  products.  But  such 
supporting  measures,  including  compensation 
for price restraint in  the nationalised industries,· 
began  to  add  to  the  public  sector's  financial 
deficit. 
A  great  deal  was  therefore  left  to  monetary 
policy  to accomplish.  In  the  aftermath  of the 
three-day working week,  business demand for 
loans began  to lessen  and  it looked for a while 
in  the  spring  as  if  short-term  interest  rates 
might  be  turning  downwards.  By  mid-year, 
however, it was no longer possible to contem-
plate  a reduction  in  domestic interest  rates  in 
view of the rises  that were  occurring  in  other 
markets  and  of the  need  for  balance  of pay-
ments reasons to maintain an  interest differen-
tial  in  favour of the., United  Kingdom.  Thus,  as 
an  illustration  of market  conditions,  the  aver-
age yield on  long-term government bonds rose 
from  12.37% at end-December  1973 to reach 
17.39 per cent a year  later,  with relatively mi-
nor  interruptions  on  the  way. 
The authorities in Ireland took a rather different 
view to the  problem  of inflation  than  in  most 
other  countries,  the  intent of monetary  policy 
in  197  4  having  been  to allow bank credit and 
the money supply to increase  in  line  with the 
growth  in  value  of  Gross  Domestic  Expendi-
ture.  The  fact that inflationary pressures  were 
often  imported from abroad  led  the  monetary 
authorities to follow a middle course of neither 
allowing  credit  policies  to aggravate  domesti-
cally-induced  inflation,  nor so  restricting  credit 
as  to  add  further  to  unemployment  for  the 
sake of controlling inflation. A limitation of cre-
dit to the personal, financial  and  property sec-
tors was,  however,  in  force  from  May of last 
year  onwards. 
Interest  rates  which  in  Ireland  are  particularly 
susceptible  to  the  movement  of  comparable 
rates in  the United Kingdom, rose progressively 22 
throughout the year  for longer-term securities. 
Yields  on  fifteen-year  government bonds rose 
from  12.33  per  cent  in  December  1973  to 
reach  a peak of 16.86 per cent twelve months 
later.  However, short-term interest and  deposit 
rates declined slightly from the very high peaks 
experienced  in  December  1973  and  early  in 
197  4, 3-month money on  the  inter-bank mar-
ket  retreating  from  16.50 per  cent  in  Decem-
ber  1973 to  13.94 per cent at the end  of last 
year. 
Monetary policy was very restrictive in Italy last 
year  as  the  public authorities sought to regain 
equilibrium  in  the  economy.  Princip~l  instru-
ments  of this  policy  were  the  import-deposit 
scheme, the reduced central bank purchases of 
government  securities  with  a  consequent  ef-
fect upon liquidity creation, and  the credit ceil-
ing in  force throughout the year but which was 
tightened  considerably  from  end-March  on-
wards.  At  the  same  time  short-term  interest 
rates  were  raised  to  very  high  levels.  These 
policy actions contributed to an  abrupt cessa-
tion  of the  excess  demand  that had  prevailed 
in  the  first quarter  of the  year. 
The  government  deficit  for  197  4  which  was 
restrained below Lit.  9 200 milliards as  part of 
the  agreement  with  the  I.M.F.  in  obtaining  a 
stand-by  credit,  did  not  swell  the  monetary 
base  as  much as  expected  since  the  large  ex-
ternal  deficit  absorbed  some  of  the  increase. 
Short-term  interest  rates  reached  very  high 
levels  during  the  year,  with the  rate  on  inter-
bank  deposits  reaching  a  peak  of  18.02  per 
cent  in  June,  but yields  on  long-term  govern-
ment  bonds  remained  relatively  low,  being 
9.33  per  cent  at  mid-year  and  rising  to  only 
10.78 per  cent  in  December. 
Concern  about  the  external  trade  position 
prompted the government to introduce an  im-
port scheme  in  May in  which  50 per  cent  of 
the value of imports, with the exception of raw 
materials  and  later  food,  was  deposited  in  a 
non-interest  bearing  account  for  six  months 
with the Banca  d'ltalia. This had  the effect not 
only of abruptly curbing  non-essential  imports 
but  of further  reducing  bank  liquidity. 
2.2.  FINANCING  IN  THE 
COMMUNITY COUNTRIES: 
PERSONAL  AND  CORPORATE  SAVINGS, 
NEW CAPITAL  ISSUES 
ON  DOMESTIC  MARKETS, 
BANK AND  OTHER  CREDITS 
TO  THE  NON-GOVERNMENT  SECTOR 
As already noted in  the previous section, bond 
markets were adversely  affected  by the  sharp 
rise in short-term interest rates in  1974 and by 
uncertainties over the course of inflation.  Most 
bond  markets  thus  suffered  a  set-back  as  in-
vestors hesitated to commit their resources  at 
long term and borrowers were reluctant to pay 
the high cost demanded of them. The  markets 
in  the Netherlands, Belgium and  Denmark nev-
ertheless  managed  to expand  in  1974. 
In  shwe markets,  a loss  of confidence accom-
panied  the  trend  towards economic  recession 
in  many of the Community countries and it be-
came  much  more  difficult  to  raise  capital 
through  equity  issues.  While the  total of new 
share issues for the Community as a whole de-
clined  by 27 per cent last year,  it is  noticeable 
from  Table 7  that  companies  in  Germany, 
France,  Belgium and  Luxembourg went against 
the  trend  in  increasing  slightly  the amount of 
capital  raised  from  this  source. 
Corporate  profitability  came  under  pressure 
from  several  directions,  principally  from  rising 
costs,  price  restraints  and  falling  turnover  to-
wards the end  of the  year.  For these  reasons 
corporate  profits  in  general  did  not  rise  in 
197  4  to  the  same  degree  as  in  the  previous 
year.  Where there were good increases in  pro-
fits these  were usually  the result  of stock ap-
preciation  (as  in  France  and  the  United  King-
dom) rather than  through improved trading re-
sults. 
There  was  no  discernible  pattern  as  to  the 
growth  of personal  savings  among  the  Com-
munity countries last year.  In  the majority there 
was  a satisfactory  increase  in  savings,  with a 
minority of countries  experiencing  a  decrease. 
However, in  view of the interest advantage av-
ailable  on  shorter-term  time  deposits  there was  a  continuation  of  the  trend  in  previous 
years to prefer such deposits to traditional  s~v­
ings  deposits.  Taking  all  market  and  bankmg 
sources  of finance  together  (see  Table 5)  the 
United  Kingdom  and  Italy,  both  of which  ex-
perienced serious balance of payments difficul-
ties,  evidently suffered  most from the adverse 
financial  climate  of  1974.  These  countries 
were followed by Germany,  Denmark and  Ire-
land  where perhaps  the  main  influence  was a 
fall  in  the  demand  for  finance  rather  than  its 
availability.  On  the  other  hand,  Luxembourg, 
Belgium,  the  Netherlands  and  France  seem  to 
have  weathered  the  difficult  conditions  fairly 
well. 
In  view of the growing inflationary pressures in 
the United Kingdom personal savings performed 
surprisingly  well,  increasing  by  about  23  per 
cent  from  a  year  earlier.  As  a  proportion  of 
personal  disposable  income,  savings  rose  to 
12.4 per  cent compared  with  11.3 per cent  a 
year  earlier.  However,  personal  savings  in  the 
form  of new bank and  building  society  depo-
sits declined by 4.8 per cent in  197  4,  as a por-
tion  of the savings  flowed into local  authority 
short-term  debt.  Company  profits  (excluding 
stock appreciation) arising from U.K. operations 
were  reduced  by  19  per  cent  last  year  with 
most of this decline the result of the shortened 
work  week  in  the  first  quarter.  Nevertheless, 
the  increase  in  profits from stock appreciation 
and  from  operations  abroad  ensured  that  net 
after-tax  corporate  income,  prior  to  providing 
fo.r  depreciation,  rose  by  15  per  cent.  The 
squeeze  on  company  liquidity  that  developed 
during the year arose from the need to finance 
the  inflated  cost  of  capital  expenditures  and 
the  increase  in  the  cost  of holding  stocks.  In 
the  manufacturing,  mining  and  oil  industries 
the  value  of  capital  investment  at  current 
prices  increased  by 39 per  cent  last  year  and 
financing  requirements  certainly  exceeded  the 
available income. For industrial and commercial 
companies as  a whole the financial deficit rose 
from  .  just  over  £ 500  million  in  1973  to 
£3 600 million in  1974. For the most part this 
deficit was financed through net bank borrow-
ings  which,  after  discounting  the  counterbal-
ancing  growth of bank deposits,  rose  by  126 
23 
per  cent  in  197  4  compared  with the  previous 
year. 
It  should  be  recalled  that  a  feature  of  1973 
was  the  extent  of arbitrage  operations  taking 
advantage  of  the  temporary  inverse  relation-
ship  between  bank  loan  and  large  deposit  in-
terest  rates.  These  arbitrage  operations  artifi-
cially  raised  both  gross  bank  lending  and  the 
increase  in  deposits in  that  year;  likewise  the 
unwinding  of  these  operations  noticeably  re-
duced the growth of these  totals in  1974. As 
a result,  the gross amount of new credit made 
available by the banking sector to the U.K.  pri-
vate sector declined by 32.6 per cent last year 
compared  with  the  flow of new credit  in  the 
previous  year. 
New mortgage  loan  act1v1ty  was  severely  re-
duced in  the first half of 197  4 and the Building 
Societies suffered a trying year.  The  inflow of 
funds  was reduced  in  the first quarter to only 
32 per cent of the amount in  the correspond-
ing  period of the previous year,  and  in  the  se-
cond  quarter  the  U.K.  public  authorities  inter-
vened  to make available up to £ 500 million  in 
loan facilities. As a result of this assistance and 
the improved inflow of funds from normal pri-
vate  sector  sources  in  the  second  half of the 
year  the  total  of  gross  new  mortgage  ad-
vances was reduced  by only 21.6 per cent for 
the year as a whole. The public sector borrow-
ing  requirement,  which  includes  the  financing 
needs  of public  enterprises,  was exceptionally 
large in  1974. Its impact on  the domestic mar-
ket  was reduced  by external  borrowing by na-
tionalised  enterprises  and  by  a  $2.5  milliard 
credit  negotiated  on  the  euromarket  by  the 
central  government  (via  domestic  banks)  of 
which  about  half  was  used  in  19 7  4.  A  sub-
stantial  volume  of  finance  was  also  obtained 
from  abroad  by  the  private  sector  (see  Ta-
ble 10). 
The  decline  of share  values  on  the  stock  ex-
change greatly inhibited the functioning of ca-
pital  markets ·in  the  United  Kingdom  last  year, 
as  in  1973.  Net  new issues  of equity  capital 
declined  by  14  per  cent  even  from  the  de-
pressed  levels of the previous year.  While un-
certainty  as  to future  business  prospects  and 24 
Table 6- Net domestic public issues of securities 
Type  of Securities  1971 
Shares  5.31 
of which: 
Credit  institutions  0.95 
Enterprises  4.36 
Bond  issues  30.71 
of which: 
Public  authorities  14.88 
Credit  institutions  11.60 
Enterprises  4.23 
Total Community  36.02 
profitability were at the root of the problem  in 
equity  markets,  the  very  high  long-term  rates 
of  interest  prevailing  during  the  year  were 
equally  a  debilitating  factor  in  the  market  of 
fixed  interest  securities  of  the  private  sector. 
New loan  issues  by listed  U.K.  public compan-
ies  were almost non-existent and  redemptions 
of existing  loans  exceeded  the  raising  of new 
capital. 
The  amount of  new  savings  available  to  the 
Italian  economy in  the form of the  increase  in 
savings deposits with banks  and  savings insti-
tutions rose  by 24.8 per  cent  in  1974, about 
in  line with the inflation rate. Within this overall 
gain,  however,  there  was  a  marked  shift  to-
wards more liquid short-term deposits as  a re-
sult of the uncertainties experienced during the 
year.  Rates of interest on bank deposits in  Italy 
rose sharply during the course of the year and, 
for demand  deposits,  stood  at  an  average  of 
10 per  cent in  December (and  in  some  cases 
much higher) compared with only 4. 7  per cent 
a year  earlier.  This  more attractive  rate  of re-
turn  tended  to  drain  small  investors  funds 
away from securities markets into bank depo-
sits.  Corporate  profitability  which  was  no 
doubt  quite  healthy  at  the  beginning  of  the 
year owing to the good output performance at 
that time,  turned downwards with the soften-
ing  of the economy and  despite the ending of 
the  price  freeze  at  mid-year. 
There  was  a  very  substantial  decline  in  new 
bond  issues  by  all  categories  of  borrower  in 
1974. Total  new  bond  issues  on  Italian  mar-
(milliard  units  of account) 
1972  1973  1974 
6.94  6.61  4.85 
1.90  1.22  1.02 
5.04  5.39  3.8,3 
26.91  36.69  22.41 
6.64  12.21  5.45 
15.63  21.18  14.97 
4.64  3.30  1.99 
33.85  43.30  27.26 
kets  declined  in  .197  4  to  only  one-third  the 
amount of the previous year.  Within this total, 
new bond  issues  by public  and  private  enter-
prises were 88 per cent lower last year than in 
1973.  For  the  most part  this  was due to the 
virtual withdrawal of private investors from the 
Italian  market which thus resulted  in  unfavour-
able conditions for new issues.  In  1973 private 
investors had taken up some Lit.  1 400 milliard 
of new bonds;  last  year,  however,  there  was 
net  dis-investment by private  investors  to the 
extent of some  Lit.\  1 700 milliard.  To  counter 
this weakness  in  the market the monetary au-
thorities at end-June  increased  by a further  3 
per cent, to  12 per  cent, the proportion of the 
banks'  total deposits against  which they were 
required  to hold  bonds  issued  by the  special-
ised  credit  institutions.  The  amount  of  new 
share  capital  raised  last  year  was  also  much 
lower than  in  1973 owing to the reduced  ex-
pectations for economic growth and  the  gen-
eral  loss  of confidence  that  took  place.  New 
share issues were more than 60 per cent low-
er  in  1974. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  year  a  12  per  cent 
ceiling  limiting  the  annual  growth of credit  in 
Italy was already in  existence  but applied  only 
loosely to certain categories of short-term cre-
dit. While this ceiling was raised to 15 per cent 
for twelve months to end-March  1975 (and  8 
per  cent  growth  for  the  six  months  to  end-
September),  it  was  nevertheless  applied  more 
rigidly  to all  categories of borrower, excluding 
only  small  industrial  enterprises  and  certain utilities.  Moreover certain  other  circumstances 
prevailing  during  the  year  tended  to  reinforce 
the  restrictive  effects  of this  credit  ceiling.  In 
May  the  import  deposits  scheme  was  intro-
duced (covering  about 40 per  cent of imports) 
and  this  syphoned  off a  large  amount of the 
available  credit growth, since  funds  had  to be 
deposited  with  the  Banca  d'ltalia.  Importers 
often  could  not  obtain  the  necessary  finance 
from  abroad  as  the  banks  were  required  to 
withhold  credit  backing  for  such  short-term 
external borrowing.  Furthermore, it can  be  ap-
preciated  that a  15  per  cent  ceiling  on  credit 
growth at a time of price inflation of about 25 
per  cent  per  annum  placed  severe  constraints 
on  the economy. 
As a result of the crisis in the bond market and 
25 
the restrictions on  credit availability, new loans 
by the financial intermediaries declined by 10.5 
per  cent  in  197  4.  Within  this  overall  decline 
there  was  some  swing  towards  shorter-term 
;credits,  the  flow of which  increased  by some 
32  per  cent  last  year. 
In  order to protect the external  reserves  while 
the  new restrictive  policies  were beginning  to 
take  effect a series  of major international  cre-
dits  were  arranged  for  Italy  including  ~DR 1 
milliard from the I.M.F  .,  $1.7 milliard from the 
Community  and  about  $2  milliard  from  Ger-
many. Additional foreign exchange was obtain-
ed,  at least  in  the first half of the year,  by the 
requirement of the public authorities that State 
enterprises  borrow as  much  as  possible,  even 
in  excess of their own needs, in capital markets 
Table  7 -Share issues by country 
(milliard  units  of account) 
Country  1971  1972  1973  1974 
Germany  1.29  1.18  1.08  1.17 
Credit  institutions  0.26  0.39  0.33  0.32 
Enterprises  1.03  0.79  0.75  0.85 
France  1.45  1.67  1.88  1.91 
Credit  institutions  0.26  0.38  0.44  0.34 
Enterprises  1.19  1.29  1.44  1.57 
United Kingdom  0.63  1.66  0.32  0.25 
Credit  institutions  0.25  0.94  0.08  0.15 
Enterprises  0.38  0.72  0.24  0.10 
Italy  1.56  1.96  2.80  0.95 
Credit  institutions  0.05  0.12  0.21  0.07 
Enterpri~es  1.51  1.84  2.59  0.88 
Netherlands  0.04  0.02  0.05  0.03 
Credit  institutions  0.01  - 0.03  -
Enterprises  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.03 
Belgium  0.28  0.37  0.33  0.42 
Credit  institutions  0.11  0.04  0.07  0.05 
Enterprises  0.17  0.33  0.26  0.37 
Denmark  0.05  0.05  0.10  0.05 
Credit  institutions  0.01  0.02  0.04  0.02 
Enterprises  0.04  0.03  0.06  0.03 
Ireland  0.01  0.03  0.03  0.02 
Credit  institutions  0.00  0.01  - 0.02 
Enterprises  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.00 
Luxembourg  0.00  - 0.02  0.05 
Credit  institutions  0.00  - 0.02  0.05 
Enterprises  0.00  - 0.00  0.00 
Total Community  5.31  6.94  6.61  4.85 
of which: 
Credit  institutions  0.95  1.90  1.22  1.02 
Enterprises  4.36  5.04  5.39  3.83 26 
abroad.  There  was  also  a  considerable  inflow 
of private  long-term  capital. 
The reduction in  the amount of finance provid-
ed  by  the  capital  market  and  the  banking 
system in  Germany had  a different origin from 
those  of  the  two  countries  described  above. 
Owing  to  the  low  level  of economic  growth 
and  investment  last  year  there  was  little  evi-
dence  of any  shortage  of funds  for  financing 
corporate  investment,  despite  the  initially  res-
trictive  monetary  policy  followed  by  the 
authorities and  the  undoubted profits squeeze 
engendered  by rising  input costs.  Net retained 
income of enterprises (excluding  certain  finan-
cial  intermediaries)  was  reduced  in  1974  to 
only 20 per cent of the amount available in  the 
previous year.  Nevertheless, depreciation provi-
sions  were higher  in  absolute  amount so  that 
Table 8 - Net domestic public issues of bonds in the Community 
(milliard  units  of account) 
Country(1)  1971  1972  1973  1974 
Germany  5.55  9.26  8.37  8.26 
Public  authorities  0.33  0.62  1.13  0.68 
Credit  institutions  4.19  7.67  6.85  6.96 
Enterprises  1.03  0.97  0.39  0.62 
France  2.94  3.31  4.97  2.55 
Public  authorities  -0.04  0.47  1.25  0.02 
Credit  institutions  1.45  1.53  2.33  1.54 
Enterprises  1.53  1.31  1.39  0.99 
United Kingdom  9.32  -0.33  3.23  1.24 
Public  authorities  8.66  -1.09  3.12  1.29 
Credit  institutions  0.17  0.21  0.05  0.08 
Enterprises  0.49  0.55  0.06  -0.13 
Italy  8.00  9.29  14.51  4.26 
Public  authorities  3.62  4.21  4.47  1.50 
Credit  institutions  3.57  3.88  8.88  2.64 
Enterprises  0.81  1.20  1.16  0.12 
Netherlands  0.78  0.78  0.49  0.84 
Public  authorities  0.37  0.28  0.12  0.29 
Credit  institutions  0.23  0.18  0.30  0.40 
Enterprises  0.18  0.32  0.07  0.15 
Belgium  2.64  2.76  2.88  2.95 
Public  authorities  1.79  2.07  2.03  1.62 
Credit  institutions  0.66  0.44  0.64  1.09 
Enterprises  0.19  0.25  0.21  0.24 
Denmark  1.34  1.71  2.18  2.27 
Public  authorities  0.01  -0.01  0.05  0.01 
Credit  institutions  1.33  1.72  2.12  2.26 
Enterprises  -0.00  -0.00  0.01  0.00 
Ireland  0.14  0.12  0.05  0.05 
Public  authorities  0.14  0.09  0.05  0.05 
Credit  institutions  - - - -
Enterprises  - 0.03  - -
Luxembourg  0.00  0.01  0.01  -0.01 
Public  authorities  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.01 
Credit  institutions  0.00  0.00  0.01  -0.00 
Enterprises  0.00  0.01  0.01  -0.00 
Total Community  30.71  26.91  36.69  22.41 
Public  authorities  14.88  6.64  12.21  5.45 
Credit  institutions  11.60  15.63  21.18  14.97 
Enterprises  4.23  4.64  3.30  1.99 
(1)  The  issues  entered under "Public authorities" include all  issues  by the government and  public institutions, 
although  the  proceeds  of these  issues  may  sometimes  make  it possible  to grant  loans  to enterprises  . 
• internal  resources  available  for  financing  in-
vestment  decreased  by only  3.5  per  cent  last 
year.  Since  capital  investment  expenditures 
(excluding  certain  financial  intermediaries)  de-
creased  by 9.5  per  cent  during  1974, the  ef-
fective  self-financing  ratio  of  German  enter-
prises  was  raised  quite  substantially  to  80.2 
per  cent  of requirements  as  against  75.1  per 
cent in  1973. A significant factor in  the relative 
liquidity of the enterprise sector  last  year  was 
that  investment  expenditures  tended  to  be 
lowered even faster than the decline in  internal 
resources. 
In  contrast, the pressures on  the public author-
ities  in  Germany to alleviate  the social  impact 
of the  economic  recession,  seen  most  clearly 
through the rise  in  the numbers of unemploy-
ed, resulted in  a swing ·in  the Government's ac-
counts  from  financial  surplus  in  1973  to  a 
heavy  deficit in  197  4.  This  swing  arose  from 
a  greater  emphasis  on  counter-recessionary 
programmes  and  from  wage  inflation  in  the 
current  expenditures  as  well  as  from  a  large 
rise  in  capital  expenditures. 
The  financial  deficits  of  enterprises  and  the 
public authorities were met in  part  by the  ca-
pital  markets.  After allowing  for  redemptions, 
net  new bond  issues  by the  public  authorities 
in  the long-term German  capital  market raised 
45  per  cent  less  than  in  1973.  Much  of this 
decline,  however,  was  offset  by  a  sharp  in-
crease  in  federal  savings  bonds'  issues,  which 
offered an  attractive yield  for a short maturity 
period. At the same time the increased govern-
ment financial deficit required  heavier recourse 
to bank  loan  financing.  The  amount of bonds 
issued  by public enterprises represented  an  in-
crease of 25.9 per cent from the previous year. 
On  the other hand,  private non-financial enter-
prises continued to redeem part of their bond-
ed  debt  while  credit  institutions  issued  a  net 
amount of DM 20 990 million  in  197  4,  a fig-
ure of 8.75 per  cent  below the previous year. 
Private  savings  increased  by  14  per  cent  in 
1974. The lower rise  in  consumption expendi-
tures  than  in  disposable  incomes,  a  concomi-
tant factor in  the economic slowdown in  Ger-
many,  reflected  a  greater  propensity  to  save. 
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These additional funds available to the financial 
system  in  1974 were,  to a larger  extent than 
in  the previous year,  directed towards increas-
ing  loans  to  the  public  authorities,  while  the 
balance  of  payments  surplus  on  current  ac-
count tended to raise the net external assets of 
the  German  banks.  Enterprises  enjoyed  ade-
quate liquidity in  197  4 and took on  the financ-
ing of a large part of foreign  trade without re-
course  to  borrowing  from  domestic  banks. 
New  bank  credits,  net  of  repayments,  made 
available to the domestic private sector declin-
ed  by about  25 per  cent  in  197  4.  But it  will 
be  recalled  that  with  an  appreciably  higher 
self-financing  ratio,  the  borrowing  require-
ments  of  enterprises  were  rather  lower  last 
year  than  in  1973.  On  the  other  hand,  bank 
lending to the domestic public authorities rose 
by 90 per cent last year and  was an  important 
element  in  the  funding  of public sector  finan-
cial  deficits. 
In  Denmark the  availability  of funds  from  the 
private  sector  in  support  of  the  investment 
programme was hampered last year by a num-
ber of adverse pressures.  In  the corporate sec-
tor the  combination  of fast  rising  wage costs 
and  some  limitation  on  passing  on  the  whole 
of  these  extra  costs,  impaired  the  ability  of 
companies to finance  investment from internal 
sources.  In  the second half of 197  4,  the sharp 
contraction in  consumer demand and industrial 
production  no  doubt  reduced  profits  even 
further.  The  growth  of  bank  deposits,  often 
used as an indicator of personal savings, declined 
sharply for most of the  year  but recovered  in 
the  closing  months;  nevertheless,  the  flow of 
new deposits to the banking  system for  19  7  4 
as a whole, was 20 per cent down on  the pre-
vious year. The upturn in  deposit growth in  the 
last quarter of the year may, in  part, have been 
due to the scheme of obligatory savings which 
was introduced by the Danish  authorities early 
in  the  year,  but  which  took  effect  as  from 
October. In  addition, the fiscal  measures taken 
by the authorities may to some extent have in-
creased the propensity to save through discou-
raging  consumer expenditures.  It is  also  possi-
ble  that there  was some  precautionary  saving 
in  the face of a threat of rising  unemployment. %
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 The  flow  of  savings  into  the  bond  market, 
however, declined  sharply in  197  4,  the  supply 
of funds  for  new  bond  issues  from  business 
and  private  investors,  insurance  and  pension 
funds  being  reduced  by  one-third  compared 
with  the  previous  year.  A  discouraging  factor 
was  undoubtedly the  steep fall  in  bond  prices 
which was the counterpart of the rise  in  inter-
est  rates  during  the first seven  months of the 
year.  In  contrast  the  Danmarks  Nationalbank 
and  social  security  funds  more  than  doubled 
their  participation  in  taking  up  new  bond  is-
sues.  The  net  result  was  that  in  total,  new 
non-government  bond  issues  declined  by  2.3 
per  cent  last  year  compared  with  the  26  per 
cent gain  in  1973. The stock market was like-
wise  under  the  pressure  of falling  prices  and 
new share  issues declined to less than half the 
amount  in  the  previous  year  (although  new 
share issues are relatively unimportant compar-
ed  with  the  very  large  bond  market).  Foreign 
capital  inflows,  in  contrast,  have  assumed 
some  importance in  recent  years  and  in  197  4 
they were  12 per  cent  higher than  in  the pre-
vious year  at an  estimated  D.  kr.  5.8  milliards. 
One  reaction  to  the  difficulties,  including  the 
high  cost,  of obtaining  finance  last  year  was 
the increase  in  business  and  commercial  loans 
negotiated  from  foreign  sources. 
As far as  the domestic banks were concerned, 
the fixed  ceiling  on  their lending commitments 
remained  in  force  until  August  after  which 
there  was  a  gradual  easing.  Inconvenient  as 
this ceiling  was during a period  in  which infla-
tion  was  adding  to  the  nominal  value  of  fi-
nancing  requirements,  it was  still  possible  for 
customers  to  obtain  credit,  if  at  high  cost, 
against  existing  commitments.  However,  bank 
lending was also  limited by a liquidity shortage 
as  was evidenced  by the failure of their depo-
sits  to  grow  during  the  first  nine  months  of 
197  4  and  their  extensive  recourse  to borrow-
ing  facilities  at  the  Danmarks  Nationalbank. 
Under these influences the amount of new cre-
dit  extended  to  the  non-governmental  sector 
by the commercial and savings banks contract-
ed  sharply  in  197  4,  being  48  per  cent  lower 
than  in  the  previous  year. 
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In  Ireland  the  supply  of  funds  through  the 
banking  system  is  more  important for  the  fi-
nancing of investment than  securities markets. 
Last  year,  the flow of savings available  to the 
Irish  financial  system,  as  expressed  by  the  in-
crease in  bank and  other deposits in  relation to 
the  rise  in  the  previous  year,  showed  a  small 
four per  cent decline  in  the  twelve months to 
December. This relatively stagnant tendancy of 
savings was perhaps the result of the contrac-
tion  in  agricultural incomes during the year.  On 
the  other hand,  company  profitability was not 
likely  to  have  been  greatly  affected  until  the 
fourth quarter at  which  time industrial  output, 
retail  sales  and  industrial  exports were all  on  a 
downward trend as activity generally slackened. 
Fiscal  policy was clearly expansionary last year 
with  the  Irish  government  borrowing  require-
ment  rising  substantially,  mainly  because  of 
higher  government  capital  expenditures.  Sub-
scriptions  received  for  the  annual  National 
Loan  issued  by  the  government  increased  by 
30 per  cent  last  year.  However,  a  major  por-
tion  of  the  Irish  government's  borrowing  re-
quirement  was  met  through  financing  from 
abroad-involving an  increase  in  gross external 
borrowing  of over  £ 160 million.  The  size  of 
these  borrowings  can  be  better  appreciated 
when comparison is  made with the annual  Na-
tional  Loan  issue  on  domestic  markets  which 
attracted £ 28 million of new capital.  Share is-
sues  by non-financial enterprises raised  38 per 
cent  less  capital  last  year,  no doubt partly the 
result  of depressed  share  markets. 
The availability of bank credit, and the demand 
for it,  was very strong  in  the  early  months of 
197  4  and  at  this  time  there  was  some 
squeeze on  the liquidity of the banking system, 
with the banks being forced to make increased 
use  of central  bank  rediscount  facilities.  From 
the second quarter onwards, however, the de-
mand  for  bank  credit  in  Ireland  eased  and 
there was a consequent growth of bank liquid-
ity.  For  1974  as  a  whole,  new  bank  credit 
made  available  to  the  private  sector  declined 
by  17  per  cent  compared  with the  supply  of 
new credit  in  the  previous year.  However,  the 30 
Table 9- Short, medium and long-term credits to the non-government sector 
(Variation  in  amounts  outstanding  at  year's  end) 
(milliard  units  of account) 
of which: 
funds  raised  through  security 
Country  1971  1972  1973  1974  issues  by  credit  institutions 
1971  1972  1973  1974 
Germany  21.31  28.84  26.56  23.25  4.45  8.06  7.18  7.28 
France  14.20  19.49  19.29  21.49  1.71  1.91  2.77  1.88 
United  Kingdom  9.09  20.70  20.93  13.83  0.42  1.15  0.13  0.23 
Italy  10.24  12.71  17.22  13.23  3.62  4.00  9.09  2.71 
Netherlands  3.47  4.83  6.62  7.92  0.24  0.18  0.33  0.40 
Belgium  1.69  2.45  2.93  2.86  0.77  0.48  0.71  1.14 
Denmark  1.95  2.74  3.43  3.03  1.34  1.74  2.16  2.28 
Ireland  -(8)  0.64  0.55  I  0.40  0.00  0.01  - 0.02 
Luxembourg  -(b)  -(b)  0.17  0.28  - - 0.03  0.05 
Total  Community  61.95  92.40  97.70  86.29  12.55  17.53  22.40  15.99 
(8)  Following an  industrial dispute in  1970 involving the banking  system  in  Ireland, statistical material on  cre-
dits is  not available for the  year  shown.  This  had  affected  the total for the  Community to a certain  extent. 
(b)  Estimates  for early  years  are  incomplete. 
private sector, like the public authorities, made 
much  more  extensive  use  of  financing  from 
abroad  than  in  the  previous  year.  Net  capital 
inflows to the  private sector  from abroad  to-
talled  about  £ 118 million  in  197  4  compared 
with  only  £48  million  in  the  previous  year. 
New  financing  made  available  by  the  Irish 
Building  Societies slackened  last year  compar-
ed  with  1973. This reduced  activity seems  to 
have  been  due  to a  slowing  in  the  inflow  of 
funds  resulting  from  the  lower  interest  rates 
offered on  deposits and  shares with the Build-
ing  Societies  than  sometimes  available  else-
where. 
For the greater  part of  197  4 Luxembourg ex-
perienced  relatively  stable  financial  conditions. 
The  ability of business  enterprises  to increase 
their  capacity  for  self-financing  undoubtedly 
followed the broad trend of business activity in 
Luxembourg.  The  appreciable  rise  of  product 
prices in the steel industry and  the strong sales 
position  prevailing  until  autumn  of  last  year 
contributed to improved profitability. But in  the 
final quarter of 19  7  4 there was a deterioration 
in  market conditions in  the steel  and  chemical 
industries and, in  early 1975, the onset of price 
competition for the fewer orders that were av-
ailable. 
There  was  a  clear  demarcation  between  the 
first  three  quarters  of  last  year  when  the 
supply of funds was abundant and  investment 
demand  yet  expansive,  and  the  period  from 
October  onwards  into  early  1975  when  the 
stagnation  of the economies of Luxembourg's 
trading  partners  was  becoming  more  pro-
nounced and business pessimism was growing. 
This  differentiation  between  the  two  periods 
was hallmarked by the trend of savings retain-
ed  in  the  form  of bank  deposits.  The  flow of 
new savings  in  time  and  savings  deposits  in-
creased in the twelve months to October 1974 
by  124  per  cent  in  relation  to  the  previous 
year.  But from  October onwards and  into  the 
early  months of  1975, there  was  net dis-sav-
ing, taking  seasonal  influences into account, as 
the amount outstanding of these  deposits de-
clined.  The  restrictions  on  mortgage  credit  in 
force  throughout  1974 brought  about  a  6.7 
per cent decline in  the value of new mortgage 
loans  granted  last  year. 
Financing  trends in  Belgium were also  less  af-fected by external developments or the cyclical 
downturn  than  in  most  other  countries.  The 
availability of internal funds for the financing of 
investment  by  corporate  enterprises  was  de-
termined  last  year  to  a  large  extent  by  the 
trend  of industrial  activity.  As  a  result  of the 
strong sales expansion in  the first half of 197  4 
and  the  gains from  stock appreciation,  profits 
gained  significantly  during  this  period.  In  the 
second half of the year,  however, a number of 
factors  such  as  the  slowing  of the  economy, 
the extension from three months to six months 
for the prior notification of price increases, and 
the pressures  of price-linked  wage costs,  took 
their  toll  on  profitability.  For  the  year  as  a 
whole,  non-agricultural  business  profits in  Bel-
gium  rose  more  slowly  than  in  1973  while 
farm  incomes  suffered  from  lower  produce 
prices. 
In  the  latter  past  of  1974 there  was  an  at-
tempt  to  stimulate  savings  which  earlier  had 
been depleted by a buying surge on the part of 
consumers. This was done both through higher 
rates  of  interest  on  savings  deposits  and 
through tax concessions.  Nevertheless, person-
al  savings  as  measured  by  the  flow  of  new 
savings ·and  time  deposits,  decreased  by  30 
per 'cent  in  1974 compared  with an  increase 
of _16  per  cent  in  the  previous  year. 
New credit made available by Belgian financial 
intermediaries declined by 7 per  cent last year 
following a 26 per cent increase  in  1973. This 
moderate  decline  can  be  attributed  in  part  to 
the ceiling on  the growth of new credit and  in 
part to the general  slackening of activity in  the 
second half of the year.  The structure of inter-
est  rates  also  played  a role  in  limiting the  de-
mand for credit last year, since the cost of new 
loans  granted  by  financial  intermediaries  was 
markedly  higher  than  in  1973. 
Net  new  bond  issues  by  enterprises  on  the 
Belgian  market rose  by 44 per  cent  last  year, 
compared with a gain of 24 per cent in  1973; 
issues by financial intermediaries accounted for 
much  of this  increase.  There  was  however. a 
contraction  in  the amount of new bond  issues 
on  behalf  of  public  sector  borrowers  which 
were  26 per  cent  down in  1974 from a year 
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earlier.  Share  markets  were  quite  active  with 
the  value  of  new  issues  exceeding  that  in 
1973 by  19  per  cent.  This  resilience  was the 
more  unusual  in  view  of the  decline  in  share 
values  during  the  year. 
The relatively low profile of investment activity 
in  the Netherlands  last  year  was rather  similar 
to that of Germany but the  pattern  of financ-
ing  bore  a closer  resemblance  to that of Bel-
gium.  The  flow of new savings  to the  Dutch 
economy,  as  evidenced  by  new  savings  and 
time deposits, declined by about 27 per cent in 
197  4  compared  with  the  exceptionally  large 
flow of such  new savings in  the previous year. 
It has  to be  noted  that time deposits are  nor-
mally regarded  as  falling  within  the  wider de-
finition  of the  money supply because  they re-
present, in  large measure, a reserve of liquidity 
for enterprises  which  use  them  to finance  ca-
pital  investment  in  a cyclical  upturn.  However, 
the  relative  shift  from  placing  funds  in  tradi-
tional savings deposits to placing them in  high-
er  yielding  time  deposits  which  continued  in 
1974 may  have  been  only  a  temporary  phe-
nomenon  which developed  in  response  to the 
interest rate differential. In  time this movement 
could be  reversed and thus the growth of time 
deposits  in  1974 may  well  have  represented 
genuine saving.  The  overall  availability of self-
generated funds for the Dutch corporate sector 
was  probably  reduced  somewhat  last  year 
despite  the  16  per  cent  rise  in  depreciation 
provisions  by enterprises.  The  maintenance  of 
a  price  freeze  last  year  with  provisions  for 
passing  on  only  certain  specified  costs,  and 
those  only  after  a  delay,  no  doubt  squeezed 
profit margins in  the Netherlands at a time of 
rising  costs of raw material  inputs.  In  addition 
labour costs for industry as  a whole were es-
timated to have risen  by  15 per cent in  19  7  4. 
However,  any  shortfall  in  the  availability  of 
self-financing  for enterprises  last  year  was  at 
least in  part made up by increased recourse to 
the  capital  markets.  For  the  purposes  of this 
study,  issues  of debt certificates (onderhandse 
leningen) are  not treated as  bond issues in  the 
Netherlands, but as part of the credit extended 
by financial institutions to enterprises. As these 
debt certificates  far  exceed  the  total  of bond 32 
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payments,  rather  than  amounts  outstanding. issues,  the  importance  of the  latter  in  the  fi-
nancing  of  investment  in  the  Netherlands 
should  not  be  exaggerated.  This  observation 
applies to the 32 per cent increase  in  1974 in 
bond issues  by the private sector, including fi-
nancial  institutions.  Net  bond  issues  by  local 
authorities increased  by 63 per  cent  while the 
central  government  passed  from  a  net  reduc-
tion  of  bonds  in  1973  to  raising  a  small 
amount in  1974. A  noticeable feature of 1974 
was the decline in  the net outflow of portfolio 
capital  from  the  Netherlands.  In  part this was 
due to the inflow of funds following the aban-
donment of the  "0-guilder" bond  circuit,  and 
in  part to a reduced demand for foreign  secu-
rities.  Borrowings by multi-national companies 
would  also  have  shown  up  in  the  balance  of 
payments  statistics  as  a  capital  inflow  but, 
because  the proceeds may only be  spent out-
side the Netherlands, these borrowings had  no 
effect  on  the domestic  economy. 
It is  probable that the high  interest charges on 
bank loans in  the Netherlands last year, ranging 
from  11.7 5 per cent to 14 per cent during the 
third quarter, according to the class of borrow-
er  and  type of credit,  caused  some  postpone-
ment of marginal  investment  plans.  This  may 
have  been  true  of  credits  against  mortgage 
debt certificates on  which the base  rate of in-
terest  rose  from  9.5  per  cent  in  December 
1973 to  12.0 per  cent  in  the  third  quarter of 
last  year.  Thus,  the flow of new credit to en-
terprises  against  debt  certificates  showed  a 
small  fall  in  1974  of  around  two  per  cent. 
Similarly,  the  flow  of  new  credit  from  the 
commercial  banks declined from an  exception-
ally high level  in  1973. Taking all  forms of cre-
dit  together,  it  seems  that  they  were  ample 
enough  not to have  constrained  the  financing 
of investment. 
Pressures  on  the  financial  system  in  France 
were  less  severe  than  elsewhere  in  the  Com-
munity.  Nevertheless,  the  existence  of a  pat-
tern  of high  interest rates,  which  for medium-
term credits ranged  from  13 to  16.5  per  cent 
from  the  second  quarter  onwards,  tended  to 
deter  borrowers  from  taking  on  longer-term 
loans.  Instead,  borrowers  increased  their  new 
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short-term  indebtedness,  particularly  in  the 
form of borrowing in foreign exchange, the an-
nual  rate of growth of which almost tripled,  in 
the expectation that interest rates would even-
tually  turn  downwards.  The  total  of new cre-
dits  made  available  to  the  French  economy, 
however,  showed  an  increase  of  only  about 
11.4  per  cent  last  year.  In  the  first  half  of 
1974  the  demand  for  new  credit  had  been 
strong  but the falling  off of economic  activity 
in  the  later  months  caused  a  contraction  of 
new  credit  business.  Nevertheless,  the  high 
rate  of  price  inflation  resulted  in  a  business 
sector  external  financing  requirement  totalling 
about  FF 30  milliard  last  year,  of which  only 
about  FF 24 milliard  was financed  from  iden-
tifiable  domestic  sources.  As  a  result  funds 
made available  to French  borrowers from for-
eign  sources  were an  important element  in  fi-
nancing  investment  last  year.  The  inflow  of 
long-term  capital  from  non-residents  doubled 
in  1974  to  FF  14900 million.  Much  of  this 
amount was in  the form of direct  investment, 
especially  for  property  development,  but  also 
there was a sizeable inflow of long-term busi-
ness  loans. 
Savings under the management of the banking 
system, namely those in  the form of new sav-
ings  and  term  deposits,  increased  by  around 
17.9 per cent last year.  Nevertheless, estimates 
indicate that the rate  of personal  savings  as  a 
proportion of disposable income in  France  de-
clined  from  17.8  per  cent  in  1973  to  about 
17.2  per  cent  last  year.  Direct  investment  in 
new housing  by individuals  was  estimated  to 
have declined somewhat in  real  terms while in-
creasing  in  value  at  current  prices.  Corporate 
profitability  no  doubt  followed  the  trends  in 
the  overall  economy,  being  particularly  strong 
in  the first half of the year but weakening, par-
ticularly in  the fourth quarter, as  industrial out-
put and sales declined. Gross trading profits by 
French  private and  public enterprises (including 
stock appreciation) rose  by about  17  per  cent 
in  1974;  excluding  stock  appreciation  the  in-
crease  was  only  1  0  per  cent.  The  need  to fi-
nance  much  higher  values  of  stock  weighed 
heavily  on  the  self-financing  ratio  which  for 
private  sector  companies  declined  from  62.6 % 
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Chart  V  - Short  and  long-term  interest  rates 
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Denmark:  no  representative  data  available. 
Netherlands: rate for 3-month bank loans to local 
authorities. 
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market. 
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per  cent  in  1973 to  58.5  per  cent  in  1974. 
The  self-financing  ratio  for  public  enterprises 
was less affected and  declined  only from 7  4.3 
to 73.8 per cent between  1973 and  1974 res-
pectively. 
A  feature of the  French  bond  market in  197  4 
was the decline in  net new issues by the finan-
cial  institutions of the private sector.  In  recent 
years  there  has  been  a  trend  towards financ-
ing, by means of bond issues, a portion of new 
long-term  credit  provided  by  institutions  spe-
cialising  in  this  form  of lending  to the  econ-
omy,  but in  197  4  the  special  financial  institu-
tions  became  temporarily  less  willing  to  lend 
and their need for finance was correspondingly 
reduced.  As a result  total new bond  issues  by 
financial  institutions on  the  French  market de-
clined  by  34 per  cent  last  year  (but  it should 
be  added  that  in  1975 the  institutions  vigor-
ously  resumed  their  lending  and  borrowing 
operations).  Similarly,  it was  the  gloomy  out-
look,  rather  than  the  high  cost  of borrowing, 
which led to a reduction in  new issues by non-
financial  enterprises of 28.5 per cent.  Compar-
ed  with the large amount of bond issues totall-
ing  almost  FF 7  milliard  in  1973, new issues 
by th~ public sector last year were almost non-
existent  and  the  authorities  resorted  to  the 
banking  system  on  a  larger  scale.  New share 
issues  increased  marginally  last  year  by  2  per 
cent,  which  was  a  better  performance  than 
might otherwise  have  been  expected  in  view 
of the  decline  in  share  prices  during  the  year. 
2.3.  DEBT  ISSUES  BY  COMMUNITY 
BORROWERS  ON  THE  SWISS 
AND  U.S.  MARKETS 
There  was a  sharp  contraction  of new  public 
debt  issues  by  Community  borrowers  on  the 
Swiss market in  1974; gross new issues totall-
ed  F  .S. 422  million  (  134  million  units  of  ac-
,· count),  a  decline  of almost  50 per  cent  from 
the previous year. The principal reasons for this 
decline  were the restrictions on  bond  placings 
enforced  by  the  Swiss  monetary  authorities 
during  the  year.  For  the  months  of  February 
and  March the total of foreign bond issues de-
nominated in  Swiss Francs was limited to F.S. 
240  million.  Within  this  total  for  those  two 
months,  Community  borrowers  issued  bonds 
worth  F.S.  134 millions. 
Later, at end-May, the Swiss monetary author-
ities  suspended  all  capital  exports  and  issue 
markets were effectively closed to foreign bor-
rowers  until  September.  For  the  months  of 
September and  October the permitted amount 
of  foreign  bond  issues  was  again  limited  to 
F  .S. 240 million  and  this  authorised  limit  was 
further reduced  to F  .S. 200 million for the  last 
two months of the  year.  Community borrow-
ers  in  fact took up  F  .S.  140 million of the new 
bond  issues  allotment for  November  and  De-
cember. 
These  restnct1ons  certainly  curtailed  the 
amount of foreign  bond placings on  the Swiss 
market in  197  4,  the total of gross new issues 
declining  to  F.S.  1 011  million  compared  with 
F.S. 2 876  million  in  1973.  Community  bor-
rowers thus took about 42 per cent of all  for-
eign  bond issues authorised on the Swiss mar-
ket  in  1974, with the  majority of activity tak-
ing  place  at the beginning  and  the end  of the 
year.  The  attraction  of  the  Swiss  market  to 
borrowers  was  the  generally  lower  interest 
rates  payable  on  borrowed  funds,  an  advan-
tage  which  was  tempered  by the  prospect of 
higher  repayment  costs  derived  from  a  rising 
currency  exchange  value. 
As from 29 January  1974 the controls on  the 
outflow of capital from the United States were 
suspended,  thus  opening  up  the  possibility  of 
non-resident borrowers seeking  capital on  U.S. 
markets.  Certain  obstacles remained,  however, 
to potential borrowers in  that the U.S.  Securi-
ties and  Exchange Commission regulations had 
to be  met and a rating obtained on  the credit-
worthiness  of bonds  to be  issued.  These  ob-
stacles delayed the re-commencement of bond 
issues  by  non-resident  borrowers  until  the 
fourth  quarter  of  last  year.  In  November,  the 
European  Coal  and  Steel  Community made  a 
$100 million  bond  issue  (rated  triple A)  with a 
5-year maturity, and which carried a coupon of 8.75  per  cent.  It  is  worth  noting  that  at  the 
time of issue,  a  borrower would  have  had  to 
concede  a  rather  higher  rate  of  interest  on 
most  other  issue  markets.  At  the  same  time 
the evidence seems to suggest that a  tr~  A 
rated  non-resident borrower on  the  U.S.  bond 
market is  required to offer a slightly higher re-
turn to investors than a similarly rated domes-
tic  borrower. 
While in  197  4  there was only one bond issue 
by a Community borrower on  the U.S.  market, 
this situation has  been  improved in  the current 
year.  Though difficulties remain,  the  U.S.  capi-
tal  market  might  be  regarded  as  a  potential 
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source of funds for companies and  institutions 
based  in  the  Community. 
Capital  raised  on  the  Swiss and  U.S.  markets 
by  borrowers  resident  within  the  Community 
would normally be included in  the statistics as-
sembled  in  Table 10.  These  statistics  illustrate 
the  very  substantial  capital  flows  between 
countries.  Last  year  in  particular,  many  Com-
munity countries made it official policy to bor-
row funds abroad on  a very large scale and  to 
encourage private enterprises to follow suit,  in 
the  expectation  that large  current account de-
ficits  would  be  incurred.  It  should  be  noted 
that  intra-Community  capital  movements  are 
included  within the figures shown in  Table 10. 
Table  10 - The contribution of external capital flows to domestic financing (1 ),  197  4 
Provisional  estimates 
(+  inflow;  - outflow) 
(million  units  of account) 
United  Nether- Belgium/ 
Germany  France  Kingdom  Italy  lands  Luxembg.  Denmark  Ireland 
Private  long-term  capital: 
Net  direct  investment  +  498  +  323  -508  +601  +  85  n.a. 
Net  portfolio investment  +1  953  +1  923 
incl.  loans  -2 136  +2 101  - 75  -687  +241  n.a. 
Total  private  long-term 
.  capital  flow  -1 638  +1953  +1  923  +2424  -583  - 86  +326  +222 (2) 
Public  sector  long-term  capital 
flow,  incl.  loans,  total  - 266  - 394  +1 048  +1  625  -208  -134  +  99  +451 
Short-term. capital  flow total (3)  -6544 +3262  +1  128  -1 515  +  41  -410  +396  n.a. 
Total  Capital  Account  of Balance 
of International  Payments (4)  -8448 +4 821  +4099  +2534  -750  -630  +821  +673 
(1)  This table  is  based  on  national balance of payments data and  national  definitions, while  similar,  may differ 
slightly  as  between  countries.  In  most cases  public  enterprises  have  been  included  in  the  public  sector. 
(2)  Includes  short-term capital  flow. 
(3)  Includes  net  external  position  of the  private  banking  sector,  except  for  Denmark. 
(4)  Residual  error  has  been  excluded  except  for  Ireland  and  Denmark. 38 
CHAPTER  3 
INTERNATIONAL  CAPITAL  MARKETS 
3.1.  THE  CONTRAST  BETWEEN  THE 
LONG-TERM  BOND  MARKET AND  THE 
MARKET  IN  MEDIUM-TERM 
INTERNATIONAL CREDITS 
If the  public  bond  issues  placed  on  behalf  of 
non-residents  by  "domestic"  banking  syndi-
cates shown in  Table 11  are  grouped together 
with those placed by international syndicates, it 
will be  seen  that the international bond market 
underwent  a  further  contraction  during  1974 
of  the  order  of  60%.  The  year  began  well 
enough for bond issues denominated in  dollars 
and  there  were  brief  periods  in  the  spring 
when  hopes  were  engendered  of a  revival  in 
issues  denominated  in  other  currencies  or  in 
European  units  of account  only to be  dashed 
by the emergence of a very large  interest dif-
ferential  in  favour of short-term interest rates. 
The  reverse  yield  differential  between  dollar 
euro-bonds and three-month euro-dollar depo-
sits  was at its highest,  rather  more than  3%, 
in  June and was not eliminated until the fourth 
quarter. 
Thus investors were attracted away from bond 
markets  for a  large  part  of the  year  by  high 
short-term interest rates and for the same rea-
son  bond dealers found it too costly to finance 
inventories  of bonds.  When  bond  markets  fi-
nally began to revive in  the fourth quarter, their 
character  had  altered  in  that the maturities of 
new issues  were appreciably  shorter,  being  in 
the five to seven  year  range  or about half the 
term that had  come to be  regarded  as  normal 
for the euro-bond market, and the amounts of 
individual  issues  were  smaller. 
The  pattern  of developments in  the  market  in 
medium-term  international  credits  was  practi-
cally the mirror-image of that of the bond mar-
ket.  About 70% of these  international  credits 
were  contracted  during  the  first  half  of  the 
year,  with the second quarter alone accounting 
for  45%  as  countries  confronted  with  huge 
balance of payments deficits, largely as a result 
of the  increase  in  petroleum  prices,  sought to 
provide  for their  financing.  The  market  began 
to show signs of indigestion after mid-year but 
nevertheless  increased  in  197  4  as  a whole by 
24 % over the previous year's figure.  It should 
be  explained  that these  statistics  of medium-
term  credits  are  derived  from  World  Bank 
sources  and  are  related  to contracts and  thus 
tend to over-emphasise the activity in  the first 
half of the year;  the drawing down of the cre-
dits  would  have  continued  well  beyond  mid-
1974. 
The  amounts  raised  through  bond  issues,  on 
the other hand, are recorded at the time the is-
sues  are  made.  A  change  has,  however,  been 
made  in  this study from  the  practice  adopted 
in  earlier  studies on  the same  theme,  in  com-
bining in  the same tables issues  placed  by na-
tional  banking  syndicates on  behalf of non-re-
sidents  with  those  placed  by  international 
syndicates. This is  because  national syndicates 
have been  tending more and more to invite the 
co-operation of international  banks  in  handling 
issues  which they formerly handled  exclusively 
themselves.  The  conventional  distinction  has 
thus  become less  and  less  meaningful  but for 
the  time  being  it  has  been  preserved  in  the 
two columns of Table 11. 
Examples of the changed  coverage of the sta-
tistics  are: 
- bonds  issued  in  one  or  more  countries  by 
non-residents,  but  which  are  not  denomi-
nated  in  the currency of the country of is-
sue; 
- bonds  which,  although  issued  by  residents 
of a specific country in  their own currency, are  expressly  reserved  for  subscription  by 
non -residents; 
- bonds  which,  although  issued  in  a  specific 
country by non-residents and  denominated 
in  that  country's  currency,  are  placed  in 
several  countries  by the  issuing  syndicates 
in  so  far  as  the  syndicates  include  foreign 
banks; 
- bonds  to  which  special  monetary  clauses 
are attached (units of account, EURCO, AR-
CRU,  and  other  multiple currency  issues). 
3.2.  PUBLIC  BOND  ISSUES  ON  THE 
EUROPEAN  INTERNATIONAL  MARKET 
AND  ISSUES  BY  NON-RESIDENTS 
ON  NATIONAL  MARKETS 
The  rise  in  short-term interest rates  up to the 
third  quarter of  1974 which had  such  an  ad-
verse  effect  upon  international  bond  issues, 
was  only  partly  attributable  to  the  demands 
placed  upon  the  short-term  euro-currency 
market for lines  of credit to cover  prospective 
balance  of payments  deficits. 
The  anti-inflationary  policies,  which  were  vig-
orously  pursued  in  industrialised  countries  to 
combat the exceptionally high rates of price in-
flation  generated  in  the  economic  boom  in 
1973 even  before  the  successive  increases  in 
petroleum prices began,  also exercised  a pow-
erful  influence  on  short-term  interest  rates. 
High  rates of inflation in  fact had a double im-
pact on  bond markets in  undermining the con-
fidence of investors in  long-term fixed  interest 
securities which carried a negative real  interest 
rate.  On  the  other  hand,  the  year  19  7  4  was 
notable for the  absence  of strong  speculative 
movements on  foreign  exchanges,  the floating 
of the  French  franc  in  January  and  the  wea-
kening  of the  dollar  being  accepted  more  or 
less  calmly.  In  this  the  high  cost  of financing 
speculative  positions  by short-term  borrowing 
was  probably  a contributory factor. 
The  contraction  in  international  bond  issues 
in  1974  was  general.  In  addition  to  the  in-
fluences  mentioned  above,  a  fall  of  43%  in 
straight bond  issues  denominated  in  U.S.  dol-
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Iars  was  ascribable  at  least  in  part  to the  re-
opening of the U.S.  dome~tic capital market to 
borrowers in  other industrial countries, brought 
about by the suspension of the Interest Equal-
isation  Tax  which  had  been  applied  to  such 
borrowers  (except  those  in  Canada)  since 
1963. The simultaneous removal of constraints 
on  foreign  investment by U.S.  residents appar-
ently  did  nothing  to  increase  the  flow of  re-
sources  to the  international  bond  market with 
which  U.S.  investors were naturally unfamiliar. 
However, the  restoration  of the  ability of U.S. 
enterprises to borrow on  this domestic market 
for the financing of projects outside the  U.S.A. 
instead of covering their needs by means of in-
ternational  capital  issues  may  have  benefited 
the  eurobond  market. 
The  decline  in  dollar-denominated  convertible 
bond issues  and  in  issues  of bonds  with war-
rants  was  even  sharper  than  that  in  straight 
bond  issues.  The  unpopularity  of such  issues 
was largely ascribable to the growing threat of 
world-wide recession. 
In  Europe  the  pressure  on  domestic  capital 
markets  had  an  adverse  effect  upon  interna-
tional  issues  denominated  in  European  curren-
cies.  Offering  yields  at  issue  were  higher  on 
the German domestic market for a greater part 
of the year than in  the Deutschemark sector of 
the international  market which  was closed  fo~ 
new issues between December  1973 and  May 
197  4, except for a brief period in  February. As 
a result  issues  denominated  in  Deutschemarks 
fell  by 78%. Similar contractions were evident 
in  the sectors denominated in  the currencies of 
other  Member  States  of the  European  Com-
munity. 
In  their  efforts to re-stimulate  what appeared 
to be a moribund market, the issuing banks re-
sorted to promoting issues in  Canadian  dollars, 
Austrian  schillings  and  Kuwaiti  dinars.  A  unit 
composed  of  Arab  currencies,  the  ARCRU, 
was  developed  but,  like  the  earlier  EURCO, 
was  not extensively  used  (the  ARCRU  opera-
tion  is  not  recorded  in  Table 11  because  it 
consisted  of a private  placing  which falls  out-
side  the scope of the statistics).  Among these 
smaller compartments of the international mar-40 
Table  11  -Gross issues of securities on the "European" international market 
(million  units  of account) 
Domestic  Syndicates  International  Syndicates 
1973  1974  1973  1974 
Convertible bonds  - - 398  68 
U.S.  dollars  - - 398  68 
Bonds with warrants  - - 119  20 
U.S.  dollars  - - 103  20 
Deutschemarks  - - 16  -
Straight bonds  454  90  2297  1 129 
U.S.  dollars  - - 1 112  635 
Canadian  dollars  - - - 46 
Deutschemarks  330  50  792  195 
French  francs  36  - 126  -
Belgian  francs  51  16  - -
Luxembourg  francs  37  24  76  -
Sterling I OM  option  - - 27  -
Austrian  schillings  - - - 13 
Kuwaiti  dinars  - - - 41 
Lebanese  pounds  - - 32  -
Units  of account  - - 82  139 
European  composite  units 
(EURCO)  - - 50  60 
Total Issues of Securities  454  90  2 814  1 217 
Borrowers in Europe (  1)  287  90  1 762  738 
Within  the  Community  249  74  1 459  520 
- European  Investment  Bank  116  9  253  112 
- Commission  of the  European 
Communities(on behalf ECSC)  106  58  69  56 
- Other  Community  borrowers  27  7  1 137  352 
Outside  the  Community  38  16  303  218 
Borrowers on the American 
Continent  36  - 813  166 
U.S.A.  36  - 566  76 
Others  - - 247  90 
Japanese borrowers  - - 21  114 
Miscellaneous  131  - 218  199 
(1)  The  geographical  classification  of borrowers has  been  based  upon  the  nationality-and hence  the  loca-
tion of the registered office-of the issuers except for holding companies which are affiliates of foreign com-
panies; these  holding companies have  been  classified  according to the nationality of their parent companies. 
Table 12 -Total resources raised by Community borrowers through public issues on the financial markets 
(milliard  units  of account) 
1973  1974 
- Net issues on  the national markets of member countries  43.30  27.26 
- Issues  on  the  European  international  market (1)  1.46  0.52 
- Issues  on  other  national  markets  0.26  0.21 
Total  Community  45.02  27.99 
(1)  As  the volume  of redemptions effected  on  Eurobonds  in  circulation  cannot  be  assessed  accurately,  the 
figures  given  here  relate  to gross  amounts  raised. ket,  it was only that denominated in  European 
units of account that enjoyed any sizeable sup-
port from investors, increasing in  size  by 70% 
in  1974. In  the confusion  which existed  in  ca-
pital  markets, a number of investors turned  to 
the European  unit of account possibly because 
it represented  less  of a risk  than  individual  na-
tional  currencies. 
Borrowers in  the European  Economic Commu-
nity raised  65 % less  through international and 
foreign  public  issues  in  1974 than  they did  a 
year  earlier.  This  fall  is  greater  than  could  be 
accounted  for by  a  slowing  in  the  growth of 
fixed  investment and  is  mostly, if not entirely, 
ascribable  to the  difficult conditions  prevailing 
in  the  international  market.  Borrowers  in  the 
United States similarly cut back their demands, 
by  87%  in  1974,  but  Japan's  share  of  the 
market  increased  several  times  as  Japanese 
banks and  a large industrial combine sought to 
cover  their  foreign  exchange  needs. 
Not surprisingly the contraction  of issuing  ac-
tivity, the accentuation of problems facing gov-
ernments and  the increased  cost of borrowing 
affected  the  sectoral  distribution  of  the  re-
sources  raised  through  international  and  for-
eign  issues.  National  governments and  public 
authorities.  taken  together,  accounted  for  a 
quarter of such  issues  during  1974 as  against 
17.5%  in  1973.  International  institutions  in-
creased  their  share  from  11 %  to  14 %  over 
the same period while that of the financial sec-
tor remained  more or less  stable at  15 %.  The 
main  sufferers  from  the  deterioration  of  the 
market  were  the  manufacturing  sector  which 
took  16%  in  1974 compared  with  25.5%  a 
year  earlier  and  energy  and  mining  which 
found  its  share  almost  halved  at  a  little  less 
than  10%. The transport and  communications 
sector performed differently from the others in 
borrowing  more,  not only proportionately,  but 
aiso  in  absolute amount during  197  4  when  it 
secured  16.5% of the funds coming on to the 
market  and  subsequently  applied  the  greater 
part of these  towards the financing  of motor-
ways,  though  with  some  going  towards  rail-
ways and  shipping.  This  pattern of borrowing, 
being  largely  the  result  of the  special  circum-
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stances  obtaining  in  1974, may well  prove to 
be  temporary. 
3.3.  INTERNATIONAL 
MEDIUM-TERM  CREDITS 
The  surge  in  internationally syndicated  credits 
during  the  first  half of  1974 was  attributable 
principally to the increase  in  the cost of petro-
leum.  The  prospect  of heavy  balance  of pay-
ments  deficits  on  current  account  resulting 
from the  higher cost  of petroleum  imports in-
duced  national  governments  both  in  develop-
ing  as  well  as  industrial  countries  to take  the 
precaution  of arranging  extensive  lines  of cre-
dit with  international  banking  syndicates.  This 
led  to  the  conclusion  of  contracts  totalling 
some  $19  milliards  (according  to  statistics 
based  on  publicised  credits)  in  the  first  six 
months of  1974 compared  with  $22 milliard 
in  the whole of 1973. The role played by pub-
lic authorities in  this expansion  may be  judged 
by the fact that, of the $12.7 milliard contract-
ed  by industrialised countries, some 76% con-
sisted  of  contracts  entered  into  by  national 
governments,  public  financial  institutions  or 
public  utilities. 
On  the  supply  side,  the  petroleum  exporting 
countries  quite  plainly  preferred  to place  their 
excess revenues in  short-term deposits, wheth-
er  in  the euro-currency markets,  the  U.S.A.  or 
the  United  Kingdom.  This  was  not  simply  a 
matter of responding  to higher  interest  rates; 
the  petroleum  exporting  countries  were  not 
over-familiar  with  long-term  capital  markets 
and  were  initially  reluctant  to  embark  upon 
long-term placements of their funds. The result 
was that the  short-term euro-currency market 
received back a substantial part of the increase 
in  oil revenues,  thus facilitating the credit oper-
ations  of the  international  banks. 
This  rapid  expansion  of the  market,  however, 
caused  the  banks  involved  to  look  with  con-
cern  at the impact on  their capital ratios.  Their 
concern  was increased  at mid-year by the fai-
lure  of a  limited  number  of other  banks.  The 
third  quarter thus saw a  reaction  in  the  form 42 
of a number of changes in  market practices as 
well as  in  the volume of activity in  the market. 
The  contraction  in  the  size  of  the  euro-cur-
rency market in  this period occurred in  the int-
er-bank  sector,  as  banks  in  general  began  to 
place  their  funds  with  more  circumspection. 
The  London  inter-bank offered  rate (LIBOR  in 
short) which had  come to be  accepted as a re-
ference  rate  of  interest  in  most  international 
credits  was  affected  by  these  developments. 
Because  of  increasing  discrimination  on  the 
part of lending banks, the interest rates offered 
as  between  banks  became  two or even  three 
tier.  The  less  favoured  banks  thus  tended  to 
find  it more  difficult if not impossible  to  par-
ticipate  in  international  syndicates.  The  prem-
ium which some of the smaller banks, or banks 
without  the  unequivocal  backing  of  a  major 
parent  institution, or indeed  banks  in  some of 
the  countries  in  substantial  balance  of  pay-
ments deficit,  had  to pay  in  excess  of LIBOR 
was  occasionally  as  much  as  2%. 
The  Governors  of  the  central  banks  of  the 
Group  of Ten  countries  helped  to restore  the 
confidence  of  the  market  by  confirming,  in 
September,  their  acceptance  of  responsibility 
for the international  market.  Subsequently,  the 
Bank  of England  and  the  Luxembourg  mone-
tary  authorities  sought and  obtained  acknow-
ledgement from the parent companies of con-
sortium banks of their links with their affiliates 
while the U.S.  Federal  Reserve  declared that it 
would be willing to act as  lender of last resort 
to  any  member  bank  of the  Federal  Reserve 
System  which found itself short of liquidity as 
a  result  of an  abrupt  withdrawal  of deposits. 
The market in  internationally syndicated credits 
had meanwhile taken steps to protect its finan-
cial position against the impact of cost inflation 
as  well as  other pressures. At the beginning of 
1974 the average margin  above  LIBOR  which 
the  banking  syndicates  normally  charged  first 
class borrowers seeking credits on floating rate 
terms  was  around  0.5 %.  Less  favoured  bor-
rowers were generally charged  0.75 %.  By the 
fourth  quarter  of the  year  these  margins  had 
risen  to ranges of  1.0-1.24% and  1. 75-2.0% 
respectively.  In  addition,  the  standard  term  to 
maturity of the  credits  had  come  down  from 
around  ten  years  to about  five  years. 
Short-term interest rates,  however, had  begun 
to  decline  from  September  onwards  and  so 
offset the increase in  borrowing costs resulting 
from the higher margins. The fourth quarter of 
197  4  accordingly  saw  a  revival  of activity  in 
international  medium-term  lending,  this  time 
with  developing  countries  entering  into  con-
tracts  equivalent  to  half  the  total. 
Thus  for  197  4  as  a  whole  international  me-
dium-term  credits  accorded  to  developing 
countries was more or less unchanged at a to-
tal  of just over $9 milliard. About 60% of this 
total consisted of credits to governments, pub-
lic  financial  institutions  and  public  activities, 
much  as  in  industrialised  countries.  Credits 
granted to government borrowers have some-
times  been  extended  directly  by  the  govern-
ments  of  petroleum  producing  countries,  but, 
although  such  "disintermediation"  has  been 
noticeable, it seems  not to have interfered ser-
iously  with  normal  international  banking  busi-
ness. 
While credits to developing countries remained 
the  same  in  197  4  as  in  the  previous  year, 
there  was  a  significant  change  in  the  type  of 
recipient  country.  Borrowing by petroleum  ex-
porting  countries  fell  away  sharply,  as  might 
have  been  expected,  but  this  movement  was 
counterbalanced  by  a rise  in  the  borrowing of 
the so-called higher- and middle-income devel-
oping  countries.  Those  countries  which  in-
creased  their borrowing the most were  Spain, 
Senegal, Argentina and  Brazil. The last two are 
petroleum  producers  if not exporters,  a factor 
of importance  in  assessing  their  creditworthi-
ness.  On  the other hand,  the  poorest group of 
developing  countries  only  achieved  a  minimal 
increase  in  borrowing  in  197  4  and  then  only 
because the Sudan  benefited from a credit ex-
tended  by other  Arab  countries. 
The  market  in  international  medium-term  cre-
dits  thus  underwent  a  transformation  during 
the  course  of  1974.  For  the  most  part,  the 
banking  institutions  operating  in  it  weathered 
their  difficulties  and  appear  to have  emerged with improved techniques.  There  seems  to be 
a  role  for this market to play  in  redistributing 
financial  resources  from countries earning  bal-
ance of payments surpluses to those in  deficit, 
particularly when  the  latter happen  to be  cre-
ditworthy developing  countries. 
CONCLUSION 
The  European  Community  managed  to  over-
come the severe .  economic and  financial  pres-
sures  to which  it was  subjected  during  1974 
but at a high cost in  terms of accepting a low-
er  level  of output and  investment than  would 
otherwise have  been  achieved.  It has  emerged 
with a different set  of policy aims,  even  if in-
flation  has  still  to be  overcome;  in  the short-
term  the  main  priority is  the  re-stimulation  of 
activity and in  the longer term an  energy policy 
has to be implemented which will entail certain 
structural  changes. 
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The  Community's  financial  markets  have  sur-
vived  remarkably  well,  if  with  a  number  of 
technical  modifications.  The  nominal  amount 
of personal  saving  appears  in  fact to have  in-
creased  and  the consequences  of the  increase 
in  petroleum  prices  seem  to  have  been  less 
serious  than  was  initially  feared.  There  has 
been  increasing  evidence  that  a  part  of  the 
surplus of oil  revenues (which  have turned out 
to be smaller than forecast) is being invested at 
long-term. The  capacity of long-term  financial 
markets for meeting the requirements of fixed 
investment  thus  seems  to  have  been  safe-
guarded. 
Perhaps  the  main  lesson  from  the  experience 
of 19  7  4  is  the  importance of the role  of con-
fidence  in  the field  of investment.  The  availa-
bility of funds for investment and the existence 
of adequate  finaAcial  machinery,  without  this 
essential element, are not enough to assure the 
volume  of  investment  needed  to  sustain  the 
rhythm  of an  economy. 44 
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